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Abstract
This thesis is a commentary and exegesis on François Laruelle’s 1977 text Nietzsche
contre Heidegger with a focus on the concept of the ‘Nietzschean problematic.’ It
explores Laruelle’s use of Nietzsche by comparing his reading with that of Gilles
Deleuze. This relation is explored in Deleuze and Laruelle’s reading of the Nietzschean
problematic through the distinction between complementarity and supplementarity to
enable a reading of Laruelle’s text as an extension of Deleuze’s project. This extension is
one that simultaneously overturns what it extends. Laruelle’s aim is presented as a
‘machinic materialism’ infused with Derridean différance. Over the course of the thesis
many of Laruelle’s concepts from Nietzsche contre Heidegger—machinic and political
materialism, politico-libidinal cut, chiasm, quadripartite—are explored to provide a more
concise picture of the Nietzschean problematic and what this problematic can do.

Keywords
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Summary for Lay Audience
This thesis provides a commentary on François Laruelle’s 1977 text Nietzsche contre
Heidegger by exploring Laruelle’s concept of the ‘Nietzschean problematic.’ To do this, I
compare Laruelle’s presentation of Nietzsche with Gilles Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche
in a number of texts including Nietzsche and Philosophy, Difference and Repetition and
Anti-Oedipus. Deleuze’s interpretation was influential in 20th century France and more
recently in English speaking continental philosophy. To provide a rupture in this
influence, the thesis explores how Laruelle expands on Deleuze’s work while
simultaneously subverting it. In doing so, the thesis also provides an introduction to the
early period in Laruelle’s work—titled Philosophy 1—that has remained untranslated,
and largely without commentary, despite Laruelle’s recent popularity by way of what is
called non-philosophy or non-standard philosophy.
The overall focus is on a concept called the ‘Nietzschean problematic,’ which I read as
the central concept of the text. This concept is notable for its development of a new
method of political production. Commenting on this concept, I explore both its various
attributes (as machinic, materialistic, intensive, chiasm, quadripartite, etc.) and the
historical lineage that precedes it (through the work of Louis Althusser and Gilles
Deleuze). The first two chapters work to gather and discuss these attributes, while the
third chapter explores how they function in the Nietzschean problematic through the
dissemination of what Laruelle terms the three syntheses of political production. Overall,
this work aims at an understanding of how any totalizing theory can be overcome by way
of problems that are inherent to it.
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Introduction
“It is just that we should be grateful not only to those with whose views we may agree,
but also to those who have expressed more superficial views; for these also contributed
something, by developing before us the powers of thought.” Aristotle, Metaphysics, 993b.
Deleuze once stated that his method of philosophy was to take an author from behind,
producing a monstrous offspring. He continues: “It was Nietzsche, who I read only later,
who extricated me from all this. Because you can’t deal with him in the same sort of way.
He gets up to all sorts of things behind your back.”1 Where Deleuze ‘buggers’ others,
Nietzsche ‘buggers’ Deleuze. As a result, Nietzsche can be seen in much of Deleuze’s
oeuvre, whether implicitly or explicitly.2 In a certain sense, Nietzsche insists on Deleuze
as ‘problematic.’3 As Nietzsche buggers Deleuze a multiplicity of concepts, in connected
rhizomatic assemblages, blossom.
Against buggery, Laruelle’s work has been read as a prophylactic: an ontological
foundation against the non-foundational contingency of promiscuous buggery.4
Deleuze’s promiscuity can be linked to his passion for concept creation (the blossoming
of n concepts). In his final work with Guattari, they define philosophy as a “continuous
creation of concepts” that are constantly changing.5 Nietzsche is presented as a figure of

1

Gilles Deleuze, “Letter to a Harsh Critic” in Negotiations trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1995), 6.
2

See Igor Krtolica, “Deleuze, entre Nietzsche et Marx : l’histoire universelle, le fait moderne et le devenirrévolutionnaire,” Actuel Marx 52, no. 2 (2012): 62, https://doi.org/10.3917/amx.052.0062.
3

‘Problematic’ is a concept Althusser derives from Jacques Martin, used in his text For Marx, trans. Ben
Brewster (New York: The Penguin Press, 1969). In this paper I read the ‘problematic’ as central to
Laruelle’s reading of Nietzsche in Nietzsche contre Heidegger.
4

See Alexander Galloway, Laruelle: Against the Digital (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota
Press, 2014), 217, fn 17.
5

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 8.
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eternal becoming—the eternal becoming of new philosophical concepts.6 If considered in
this light, the prophylactic response of Laruelle can be read as a form of abstinence.
Laruelle refuses to enter the game of promiscuous creation, working instead through a
Nietzsche of reduction [réduire] (NcH 71). Where Deleuze’s promiscuity produces new
images of thought, Laruelle’s abstinent withdrawal invents a Nietzsche that says no to the
image of thought.
This thesis presents a comparative analysis of these two thinkers through their use of the
‘Nietzschean problematic.’ The aim is two-fold: first to provide commentary on
Laruelle’s Nietzsche contre Heidegger; second, to use that commentary to interrogate the
Laruellean rupture of Deleuze’s project: going ‘beyond’ or ‘overcoming’ Deleuze.
Deleuze institutes, through Nietzsche, a rupturing of what he terms the ‘dogmatic image
of thought.’ It is in a similar manner that Laruelle introduces the Nietzschean Rebel as
one who ruptures the Master or dominating force within thought. In both cases it is
Nietzsche who provides the possibility of a new, political problematic that ruptures the
old figure of dominance. This thesis seeks out that political formulation.7 Laruelle has
spilt a great deal of ink differentiating himself from Deleuze.8 This is an effort that has
continued in secondary literature.9 What distinguishes this thesis from these other

6

Ibid., 113.

7

As Nandita Biswas Mellamphy points out, the ‘political’ in Nietzsche “follows a peculiar materialist view
of politics as the physiological activity of ‘overcoming’ within a living environment for which he coins the
term known as ‘will to power’” in “Nietzsche and the Engine of Politics,” in Nietzsche and Political
Thought, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson, Bloomsbury Studies in Continental Philosophy (Boston: Bloomsbury,
2014), 141.
8

The most notable example is in François Laruelle, Philosophies of Difference, trans. Rocco Gangle,
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013) where Laruelle critiques Deleuze, Derrida, Heidegger and
Nietzsche for reifying what he calls the philosophical decision.
9

See Majorie Gracieuse, “Laruelle Facing Deleuze: Immanence, Resistance and Desire,” in Laruelle and
Non-Philosophy, ed. John Mullarkey and Anthony Paul Smith, Critical Connections (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2012), 42–59; Anthony Paul Smith, Laruelle: A Stranger Thought, 16-24; “Thinking from
the One: Science and the Ancient Philosophical Figure of the One” in Laruelle and Non-Philosophy, eds.
John Mullarkey and Anthony Paul Smith, Critical Connections (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2012); Katerina Kolozova, Cut of the Real (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2014). 59-64; and
Erik Del Bufalo, Deleuze et Laruelle: De La Schizo-Analyse à La Non-Philosophie, Bibliotèque de NonPhilosophie (Paris: Éditions Kimé, 2003).
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analyses is that it is placed squarely in Laruelle’s early work as a commentary on NcH.
Secondary literature on Laruelle in English has mostly stepped past the work in
Philosophy I (consisting of Machines textuelles, Nietzsche contre Heidegger, Le déclin de
l’écriture, and Au-delà du principe de pouvoir) to engage with non-standard philosophy.
As a result, there is a shortage of secondary literature on Philosophy I and NcH (the texts
written during this period have yet to be published in English).10 Nevertheless, as Nandita
Biswas Mellamphy shows in her productive use of Laruelle’s Nietzsche, there is ample
room for further development in this area of scholarship. Laruelle’s text provides a novel
account of Nietzsche that aims to think outside the dogmatic mastery that haunts thought.
When useful I have drawn on secondary literature from non-standard philosophy, though
I have limited this to areas where Laruelle’s conceptualization in NcH foreshadows his
non-standard philosophical concepts (for example, the concept of critique as reduction is
placed alongside the non-standard practice of radicalization in chapter 2). Furthermore,
while I have drawn upon the secondary literature, primarily through the work of Biswas
Mellamphy and Smith, much of this project emphasizes an exegetical reading of NcH as
it relates to the Nietzschean problematic.11
It might be objected that a focus on NcH is useless given the developments of Laruelle’s
thought. The fact that NcH falls within the principle of sufficient philosophy (PSP),
leaves it open to attack.12 Yet, Laruelle himself clarifies that his early project “already

10

The field is not, however, completely barren. See Nandita Biswas Mellamphy. “Nietzsche and the
Engine of Politics” and “Nietzsche’s Political Materialism: Diagram for a Nietzschean Politics” in
Nietzsche as Political Philosophy, ed. Manuel Knoll (Boston: De Gruyter, 2014), 77–89; Anthony Paul
Smith, Laruelle: A Stranger Thought, 58-67; and Smith A Non-Philosophical Theory of Nature: Ecologies
of Thought (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 73-81; Rocco Gangle, François Laruelle’s
Philosophies of Difference, 16; and Alexander Galloway, Laruelle:Against the Digital (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 187-188).
11

The limited secondary literature is one of two factors that have led to the focus on NcH as the sole
consideration from Philosophy I. These limits produce a burden (in terms of translation and exegesis) that
is demanding for a project of this size. This is a particular issue when dealing with Laruelle given his usage
of philosophical concepts without reference to their origin. Laruelle expects much of his reader, assuming a
breadth of knowledge of the 20th century French milieu. As such I have limited my analysis to this text,
with attempts to clarify where Laruelle is drawing concepts from and showing how he implements them in
novel ways (with a particular interest in the concepts that derive from the Deleuzian oeuvre).
12

Laruelle defines the PSP as the “fundamental auto-position, which can also be its auto-actualization or
auto-fetishization” in Philosophy and Non-Philosophy trans. Taylor Adkins, (Minnesota: Univocal, 2013),
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sought to put certain themes to work” that would be developed in the later literature.13 If
nothing else, a study of Philosophy I is useful as a bridge to the later work. Furthermore,
NcH provides an escape of standard thought from within standard thought, even if that
thought lacks sufficiency. Laruelle’s own trajectory can be taken as an example, insofar
as it is from this project that a non-standard thought becomes possible. Despite nonstandard philosophy’s use of philosophy, it remains (outside) standard philosophy in its
problematization of standard philosophy by way of the signification ‘non.’ Here,
(outside) is bracketed to suggest that non-standard philosophy is both ‘interior to’, but not
‘of’ standard philosophy. It is in a position of interior alterity in relation to standard
philosophy. Considering this, NcH (and Philosophy 1 as a whole) provide a critique of
standard philosophy that is not (outside) standard philosophy (in the sense of nonstandard philosophy). NcH provides a critique of standard philosophy on the terrain of
standard philosophy.
In Principles of Non-Philosophy, Laruelle describes Philosophy 1 as “the attempt to
construct a problematic rivaling that of Marx, though mainly on Nietzschean terrain and
with Nietzschean means.”14 It is this problematic that is of primary interest. His means
for achieving this are described, in Machines Textuelles, as bringing together Deleuze and
Derrida in a “Delida/Derreuze series.”15 Anthony Paul Smith suggests that Laruelle’s
early period can be read as a materialist take on deconstruction: A deconstruction
infringed with a machinic materialism.16 This thesis moves in a complementary direction,
instead reading Laruelle through Deleuze with Derrida as a supplement: a machinic

12. The PSP is the philosophical act of positioning itself as absolute; the tendency of philosophy towards
transcendence. This principle works by way of the philosophical decision (PhD) or ‘auto-position’ that a
philosophy decides to render as transcendent to the Real. In a description of Philosophy 1 he suggests that
“Philosophy 1 placed itself under the authority of the Principle of Sufficient Philosophy” in Francois
Laruelle, Principles of Non-Philosophy, trans. Nicola Rubczak and Anthony Paul Smith (London:
Bloomsbury, 2013), 33.
13

Laruelle, Principles of Non-Philosophy, 33.

14

Laruelle, Principles of Non-Philosophy, 33.

15

François Laruelle, Machines Textuelles (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1976), 18.

16

Smith, Laruelle: A Stranger Thought, 63.
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materialism infringed with deconstruction. Among the texts written in this period, NcH
with its emphasis on a Deleuzian Nietzsche, is the most pertinent to this study. While the
others work within the Delida/Derreuze strain of thought, their emphasis tends towards
Derrida and Freud more than with NcH’s explicit emphasis on Nietzsche and implicit
emphasis in Deleuze. With a desire to unpack the Nietzschean problematic through
Deleuze and Laruelle, I have chosen to focus on this text from Philosophy 1.
As Smith notes, Laruelle’s writing during this period is part of a larger move within
French philosophy to craft a political Nietzsche. Prominent voices in this discourse were
Deleuze and Sarah Kofman. Deleuze’s work is heavily influenced by his political reading
of Nietzsche: NP heavily informs both DR and The Logic of Sense. He draws upon the
Nietzschean concepts of the will to power and eternal return to conceptualize a material
source of production that breaks from the Hegelian dialectic (NP 8). It is this reading of
Nietzsche—one that leads up to the machinic materialism developed alongside Guattari
in Anti-Oedipus—that heavily informs NcH. In order to better ascertain the role of that
development in Laruelle’s thought, I have taken a broader approach to Deleuze’s oeuvre,
citing most heavily from three texts that appear to inform Laruelle: Nietzsche and
Philosophy, Difference and Repetition, and Anti-Oedipus.17
I have organized this thesis with the aim of understanding the Nietzschean problematic as
invented in Laruelle. The first and second chapter focus on grasping attributes of this
problematic as they are raised by Laruelle. In a sense, these chapters gather material to be
used in the final chapter as it institutes an understanding of the Nietzschean problematic.
The order I have chosen to introduce these various attributes, when possible, follows
Laruelle’s own order of introduction in NcH.

17

Approaches to Deleuze on Nietzsche tend to fall into two camps. with some emphasizing a break from
Nietzsche in the works with Guattari, and others taking a more ecumenical approach suggesting that
Nietzsche pervades even the late writings. From the former see Petra Perry, “Deleuze’s Nietzsche,”
Boundary 2 20, no. 1 (1993): 174–91, https://doi.org/10.2307/303181. For the latter see Igor Krtolica,
“Deleuze, entre Nietzsche et Marx : l’histoire universelle, le fait moderne et le devenir-révolutionnaire.”
Actuel Marx 52, no. 2 (2012): 62. https://doi.org/10.3917/amx.052.0062.
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The first chapter provides exegesis on the quadripartite/chiasm, a-signification, and
duplicity/supplementarity. It begins by positioning the 4 terms of the quadripartite —
Rebel, Resistance, Master, Fascism — as the central struggle of the Nietzschean
problematic. A large part of this chapter takes up Mastery as an extension of what
Deleuze calls the dogmatic image of thought. After locating Deleuze’s concept in NP and
DR, the chapter explores the role of the Rebel in overthrowing this form of Mastery. The
second half interrogates how Laruelle distinguishes himself from the Deleuze through the
use of duplicity. The Derridean use of supplementarity is instituted as supplement to the
Deleuzian schema, contrasted with what Laruelle terms Deleuze’s complementarity. This
chapter closes with an exposition of how this quadripartite works in a duplicitous manner
that allows Laruelle to claim that the “Nazis are Nietzschean, but Nietzsche is not a Nazi”
(NcH 51).18
The second chapter continues the work of gathering concepts with a focus on the
continent of politics, machinic materialism, and intensity. It begins by situating Laruelle’s
notion of a Nietzschean continent of politics in relation to Althusser’s conception of a
Marxist continent of History. This enables a discussion of Laruelle’s positioning of a
machinic materialism and a political materialism that displace the Marxist notions of
historical materialism and dialectical materialism, respectively. This flows into a
discussion of machinic and machinic materialism more generally by exploring Laruelle’s
three theses on machinic materialism. The second part of this chapter explores Laruelle’s
conceptualization of critique as reduction by distinguishing Foucauldian ‘statements’ and
Nietzschean ‘propositions.’ The concept of reduction is explored in relation to Laruelle’s
later discussion of radicalization. The final part of this section expands more rigorously
on the concept of machinic materialism through its attribute of intensity.
With these concepts developed in the earlier chapters, the final chapter dives into the
Nietzschean problematic as a political invention or politico-libidinal cut. The first section
explores the Althusserian problematic in more depth in order to distinguish Althusser’s

18

When citing from NcH directly, I have chosen to include the original French in the footnote: « …les
nazis sont nietzschéens, mais Nietzsche n’est pas nazi » (NcH 51).
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notion of ‘break’ from Deleuze and Laruelle’s problematic as a ‘rupture.’ The second
section provides an in-depth analysis of Deleuze’s conceptualization of the problematic
through the mathematical work of Georges Bouligand and Albert Lautman in the
conceptualization of singular points through the development of Poincaré curves and the
mathesis universalis. From there, the remainder of the chapter institutes Laruelle’s
rupture/reduction of the Deleuzian problematic in a supplementary fashion. This chapter
closes with a discussion of the implementation of this problematic in light of the claim,
made by Laruelle, that Nietzsche makes himself a fascist to better overcome fascism.
A few points of housekeeping are in order. Given the title of Laruelle’s text as Nietzsche
contre Heidegger, the eliding of Heidegger from the discussion might seem suspect. The
focus of my commentary is on the first two parts of NcH. The first two sections of
Laruelle’s text unpack the concept of the Nietzschean problematic, while the third
chapter takes up Heidegger as a case study in misreading Nietzsche through signification.
Because my project to explore Laruelle’s Nietzsche as an overcoming of Deleuze’s
Nietzsche I found it useful to elide the Heideggerian case study, instead focusing on the
development of the Nietzschean problematic and comparing that with what is given by
Deleuze.
Second, it is apparent that the Nietzschean text is largely missing from this analysis. I
seldom cite any of Nietzsche’s works. The reason for this will become clearer through the
first chapter but it is worth mentioning here. Laruelle’s invention of a Nietzsche
problematic is one that is a-signifying rather than textual or signifying. Biswas
Mellamphy points out that Laruelle breaks with the ‘post-structuralist’ reading of
Nietzsche, seen in Foucault, that focuses on the signifying tendency. Deleuze gets closer
to the a-signifying tendencies, but his notion of ‘force’ leans too strongly on the
individuating or signifying tendency.19 As I discuss in chapter 1, Laruelle explicitly
suggests that citing Nietzsche doesn’t prove anything, insofar as the focus on
signification allows one to make Nietzsche say anything. For this reason, the various
contradictory readings of Nietzsche do not provide an account of Nietzsche. Instead they
19

Biswas Mellamphy, “Nietzsche as Political Philosopher,” 80-81.
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are symptomatic of the Nietzschean problematic. Following Laruelle, I have largely
refrained from citing Nietzsche directly.
Finally, it is worth noting that, as a commentary on Nietzsche contre Heidegger, I have
quoted heavily from that text. As I have relied on my personal translation of that text, I
have provided the original French quotations as footnotes.

xv
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Chapter 1

1

The Quadripartite as A-signifying Duplicity

This chapter interrogates Laruelle’s conception of the quadripartite, its four terms
(Master, Fascist, Rebel, Revolutionary), and their relation of duplicity along two poles. It
begins by investigating the four terms and exploring the positions of domination and
dominated. Drawing upon Gilles Deleuze’s consideration of the ‘image of thought,’ it
positions domination and Mastery alongside representation and signification to which
Laruelle contrasts rebellion as a-signification. To build on this theme, Deleuze’s
development of the relationships between active/reactive and affirmation/negation are
used as a starting point to explore the relation of signification to a-signification.
Deleuze’s use of complementarity then contrasted with Laruelle’s use of Derridean
supplementarity as a basis for presenting a-signification in a position of duplicity,
sovereignty, and unilaterality to Mastery.

1.1 Mastery and the dogmatic image of thought
The second thesis of Nietzsche contre Heidegger announces the four terms of the
quadripartite. Laruelle names Nietzsche both a fascist thinker and the thinker who
subverts fascism, writing, “Nietzsche is, in a double sense, the thinker of fascism: he is,
in a certain manner, a fascist thinker, but he is first the thinker of the subversion of
fascism” (NcH 9).20 This is possible insofar as Nietzsche is described as a process or
operation: “Nietzsche-thought is a complex political process of two ‘contradictory’ poles
(but without mediation), the relation of subordination of a secondary fascist pole
(Mastery) to a principal revolutionary pole (Rebellion). Nietzsche makes himself fascist
for better defeating fascism” (NcH 9).21 The four terms — Master, Rebel, Fascist,

20

« Nietzsche est, en un double sens, le penseur du fascisme: il est, d’une certaine manière, un penseur
fasciste, mais il est d’abord le penseur de la subversion du fascisme » (NcH 9).
21

«La pensée-nietzsche est un procses politique complexe à deux pôles « contradictoires » (mais sans
médiation), le rapport de subordination d’un pôle fascisant secondaire (Maîtrise) à un pôle révolutionnaire
principal (Rébellion). Nietzsche s’est fait fasciste pour mieux vaincre le fascisme, il a assumé les pires
formes de la Maîtrise pour en devenir le Rebelle » (NcH 9).

2
Revolutionary — operate on two poles of domination and dominated.22 Laruelle’s
subsequent theses expands on the relationship between these poles, naming it a
‘contradiction without mediation,’ and signaling that Nietzsche operates not in a duality
or dualism, but in a new sort of relation called a ‘duplicity.’ Laruelle stresses that these
terms “no longer have… their expected meaning” (NcH 10).23 Early on, the Rebel and
Revolutionary are related to the characteristics of affirmation and “active resistance to all
dominant power” in Mastery and Fascism (NcH 11).24 Readers of Nietzsche may remark
that Laruelle’s use of Mastery does not fit Nietzsche’s own: following On the Genealogy
of Morality, one might be inclined to think Master alongside the ‘noble’ or ‘lord’ who are
torn down by the ressentiment of the ‘slave revolt in morality.’25 Laruelle acknowledges
this reading, clarifying that Nietzsche’s usage is different than the contemporary usage: in
Laruelle it is the noble who are Rebels and the weak who are Masters (NcH 44).
The term ‘Rebel’ does not contain a fixed meaning. Instead, it invents new meanings:
“The Rebel’s point of view allows an understanding of Master, and it is more than an
inversion of traditional theory… the sovereignty of this Rebel’s point of view implies a
new definition of Master and Rebel” (NcH 53).26 In Rebellion, a name no longer
signifies the expected meaning. Laruelle clarifies that the names, themselves, matter less
than the syntax: a syntax that is a-signifying. Nietzsche contains a novel possibility that
can be unpacked. Laruelle writes that all politics prior to Nietzsche are the politics of
Mastery:
22

Biswas Mellamphy points out that this chiasm—of four terms rather than two—undoes binary logic for a
‘syntactical machine’ whose ‘double-crossing lines’ produce an ambiguity of signification: four terms that
undo the prioritization of dualism. See “Nietzsche and the Engine of Politics,” 154-155.
23

«…les catégories de Fascime et de Révolution, de Maîtrise et de Rébellion, qui n’ont plus, on s’en
doute, leur sens attendu » (NcH 10).
24

«…de résistance active à tous les pouvoirs dominants » (NcH 11).

25

See Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, in Beyond Good and Evil / On the Genealogy of
Morality, ed. Adrian Del Caro, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Vol. 8 (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2014), 228-231.
26

«C’est le point de vue du Rebelle qui permet de comprendre celui du Maître, et c’est plus qu’une
inversion de la théorie traditionelle… la souveraineté du point de vue du Rebelle impliquent une nouvelle
définition de la Maîtrise et de la Rébellion » (NcH 53).

3
All politics before Nietzsche…Greek, Bourgeoisie, Marxist, and now the
Freudians, presuppose diversity by means of theoretical and practical opposition.
But these always reconcile a unique and fundamentally double limitation: always
politics by delegation and derivation, and always a politics by and for the
Master… (NcH 54)27
Politics operates on a double movement of Rebellion and Resistance. First, Rebellion
overthrows the dominant position of Mastery, but in a second move the Rebel reinscribes the ‘auto-position’ of Mastery onto itself: Rebel is reversed onto the position of
Master in the act of overthrowing the Master. Working towards a new definition of both
Rebel and Master, the Nietzschean Rebel is an attempt at that “which does not contain the
genetic definition of any identity or presence, [those principles comprising a] matrix of
all dominant relations, as one finds in bourgeois representation...” (NcH 56).28
The issue with representation can be unpacked through Deleuze’s conceptualization of a
‘dogmatic image of thought.’29 In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze introduces the
concept via three principles: 1. A thinker wants truth, that thought contains truth, and that
it is sufficient to think truly to think truth; 2. Forces foreign to thought produce
falsehoods in thought (i.e. errors); and 3. Thinking is a method and one can ward off error
by practicing it (NP 103). That which forces thought to think is not considered in this
schema because truth is presupposed as an abstract universal that dogmatically institutes
a relationship between philosophy and the outside of philosophy: philosophy “assigns, a
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priori, a form to the outside.”30 Deleuze expands on this in the third chapter of DR,
providing 8 postulates of this dogmatic image of thought. The first four of these
postulates are sufficient for the investigation at hand insofar as they provide an account of
identity and representation.
The first postulate is similar to what is raised in Nietzsche and Philosophy: a principle of
Cogitatio nature universalis (roughly translated as ‘thought of universal nature’).
Thought is not only natural and good, but everyone has a desire to know the truth:
“thought has an affinity with the true, it formally possesses the true and materially wants
the true” (DR 131). According to Deleuze, this postulate is central for philosophical
investigation because philosophy presupposes a desire for the truth. Tied to this first
postulate is a second: the postulate of the Ideal or common sense. The second postulate
extends the first postulate to a universal condition. Common sense presupposes everyone
agrees about “what it means to think” (DR 131) with everyone agreeing to the first
postulate. Together the first two postulates of the image of thought produce a universal
thought derived from common sense. This universal operates dogmatically as a priori
condition that doesn’t need investigation.
The third postulate — the recognition of good sense — develops out of these first two.
Defined as “the harmonious exercise of all faculties upon a supposed same object,”
recognition allows one to identify an object by way of one’s distributed faculties (DR
133). Working together, the faculties operate on the same object or ‘form of the Same’
(DR 134). This is the determination of the faculties working in harmony to develop an
understanding of a thing that exists outside of thought; one that is subsequently
recognized by thought as a form of representation or identity. In other words, if
something looks like an apple, smells like an apple, feels like an apple and tastes like an
apple—with these various sensory faculties aligning on that object—then the object is
recognized as a thing represented by the signifier ‘apple,’ a signifier that exists prior to
the apple as an abstract universal. Deleuze suggests that this model is used in
30

Francois Zourabichvili, Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event: Together with The Vocabulary of Deleuze,
ed. Gregg Lambert and Daniel W. Smith, trans. Kieran Aarons, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2012), 45.

5
philosophical investigation from Plato through Kant (DR 134). The fourth postulate,
representation, develops out of this recognition, as the signifying a priori that applies
itself to the object at hand. The object is never simply the object, but always a secondary
“representation in relation to a [primary] conceived identity, a judged analogy, an
imagined opposition, or a perceived similitude” (DR 138). Rather than allowing the
object to determine its own identity, the relationship is reversed insofar as the identity,
‘apple,’ is said to determine the object that has been signified as apple. This is because
the first postulate holds truth to be an abstract universal independent of real experience.
Thus, abstract universal truth, here a representation, determines the real for philosophy.
In NP, Deleuze uses the inflation of error in philosophy as evidence of this: “the concept
of error would therefore express, by right, the worst that can happen to thought, that is to
say the state of thought separated from truth” (NP 105). An abstract, universal truth, in
the form of a presupposed, a priori representation, becomes the only thing that this image
of thought seeks; error becomes its nemesis.
In his text on Proust, Deleuze suggests that the dream of each philosopher is “to set up an
image of thought that no longer depends on the goodwill of the thing and on a
premeditated decision.”31 This is the task that Nietzsche succeeds in: producing a ‘new
image of thought’ that is active and critical, providing the philosopher with freedom from
representation in the dogmatic image of thought (NP 108). This is not a ‘prephilosophical image’ but the criteria for new forms of thought to emerge in the
interaction with the world. Deleuze suggests that Nietzsche provides these criteria for a
new kind of philosophy, one that works from the world rather than through pre-given
methods or schema (operating with a presupposed, universal representation).
Deleuze’s dogmatic image of thought is a kind of Mastery. In the Laruellean sense, the
image of thought is dominated by a representational image. Textuality and signification
also come under this determinate and representational Mastery insofar as it limits
thought’s ability to think actively and critically. In-the-last-instance, textuality and
signification overdetermine what they signify, producing a representation that determines
31
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what it represents (the Idea of ‘apple’ determines the object as an apple, rather than the
object determining the idea). Mastery is a form of signification that dominates. For
example, one could take tyranny as an example of a representation (or signification) in
the political field that dominates in a certain time and place. Against this Master, a Rebel
attempts to overthrow the tyrant in an act of Revolution. Nevertheless, as Laruelle
suggests, this Rebellious act of overthrow is accompanied by a subsequent re-inscription
of the Rebel as a new signification or textuality (a new representation) that itself comes to
dominate (feudalism replaces tyranny, capitalism replaces feudalism, etc.). The Rebel, in
putting forward a new politics, inscribes that politics as a new domination or Mastery: a
new signification.
Here, one can see the operation of the two poles and four terms at play. The MasterFascist pole perpetuates a dogmatic image of thought in a representation or signification
of the ‘Same.’ This Sameness dominates thought to keep the subversive RebelRevolutionary at bay. Where the Master dominates, the Fascist is the hatred of the Other.
The Fascist aim is the complete destruction of the Rebel. The Fascist wants to stop the
perpetual play of Master and Rebel, where the revolutionary side comes to itself signify
and dominate against as Mastery (NcH 64).32 Nevertheless, what these terms signify is
less important than the operation of the four terms in a chiasm or quadripartite. The terms
are weak names, insofar as the chiasma is a-signifying. Attempting to signify the terms,
independently, is a fool’s errand.
Within this quadripartite of four terms, the Nietzschean overcoming of fascism can take
place. Moving past the dogmatic image of thought with a new form of Rebel—one that is
not determinate of a new signification—Laruelle’s Nietzschean problematic moves
beyond the matrix of dominant relations. This Rebel is both the subversion of identity,
signification, and representation critiqued by Deleuze as the image of thought, as well as
the domination of presence critiqued in Derrida’s work. Much as Deleuze marks the
history of philosophy as giving precedence to a dogmatic image of thought, Derrida
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explores that history of philosophy, prior to Heidegger, as privileging presence. In “Ousia
and Grammē: Note on a Note from Being and Time" he writes:
From Parmenides to Husserl, the privilege of the present has never come into
question. It could not have been. It is what is self-evident itself, and no thought
seems possible outside its element. Nonpresence is always thought in the form of
presence (it would suffice to say simply in the form), or as moralization of
presence. The past and the future are always determined as past presents or as
future presents.33
Presence is a notable foil in Derrida’s thought as it impacts his understanding of the trace,
différance, supplementarity, etc. (all of which are explored in relation to presence). His
essay looks at a footnote in Heidegger’s Being and Time to determine whether Heidegger
escapes the Aristotelean notion of “time on the basis of ousia as parousia, on the basis of
the now, the point, etc.,” or whether Heidegger, too, repeats the history of presence.34
This leads Derrida to think “a difference more unthought than the difference between
Being and beings... Beyond Being and beings, this difference, ceaselessly differing from
and deferring (itself), would trace (itself) (by itself) – this différance would be the first or
last trace if one could still speak, here, of origin and end.”35 Différance can be said
without presence or absence: a usage that Laruelle adopts in his use of supplementarity.
Laruelle’s Rebel is a Rebel who is not reversed in Master; one that is ‘non-symbolic,’ ‘asignifying’ [non-symbolique, a-signifiante]; a Rebel without identity, representation or
presence (NcH 56). As a-signifying, Nietzsche moves beyond a ‘classic image of
Nietzsche,’ i.e. a textual, signified Nietzsche who can be understood through citation
(NcH 154). Biswas Mellamphy notes that Laruelle recognizes “Nietzsche to be a
theoretical object with material effects, rather than as a historical subject or interpreter
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expressing his thoughts.”36 Nietzsche is not an identity in Laruelle; Nietzsche is a syntax.
Biswas Mellamphy describes this syntax as genetic and a-signifying: “the syntax
underlying Nietzsche’s kind of physiological thinking is a-signifying, but nonetheless
‘genetic,’ or ‘generative’/‘productive’ of difference…It is a syntax that is ‘genetic’ in that
it has a ‘form-shaping’ function.”37 Nietzsche is not a signified identity, but instead an asignifying operation that cannot be justified by turning him into a figure of signification.
This relates to textual support: Laruelle claims “[a] citation has never proven anything,
principally in the case of Nietzsche” because a citation of Nietzsche turns him into a
figure of signification and Mastery (NcH 140).38 A-signifying, the Nietzschean Rebel is
not itself signified but is a genetic element that produces signification (as will be explored
below). If ‘Rebel’ names anything, it is a weak naming, a name without Sameness or
stable signification. In part, this is why the Fascist reading of Nietzsche comes easy, for it
requires turning him into a figure of signification. Laruelle continues, “[a] citation of
Nietzsche provides little as it is always possible to make him serve opposing theses or
politically divergent tendencies” (NcH 141).39 Within these opposing theses there is a
central agreement: both turn Nietzsche into a figure of signification.

1.2

A-signification and duplicity

Laruelle’s quadripartite is initially similar to the of the four characteristics of Nietzschean
thought that Deleuze interrogates in NP. The Master-Fascist pole is similar to what
Deleuze terms Reaction and Negation, while Rebel-Revolution can be placed alongside
Deleuze’s Active and Affirmation. NcH’s use of Deleuze’s terms alludes to some
relationship these concepts and the Nietzschean problematic:
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...it must fill this with the four functions which characterize force and will to
power: activity and reactivity (as qualities of the partial organs of power),
affirmation and negation (as qualities of the will to power). This criterion of
power is of a libidinal matter as determinant [determinante] and Power Relations
as determined [déterminés] is explained in a quadruple form: four terms coupled
in pairs, and in various relationships of affinity or repulsion. We have called them
différantials and they constitute the minimal content of the problematic of
Political Materialism and Machinic Materialism (NcH 96).40
Laruelle’s designation of ‘four functions’ (activity, reactivity, affirmation and negation)
as related to the ‘partial organs of power’ and the ‘will to power’ comes directly from
Deleuze. The latter writes, “active and reactive designate the original qualities of force
but affirmative and negative designate the primordial qualities of the will to power.
Affirming and denying, appreciating and depreciating, express the will to power just as
active and reactive express force” (NP 53). In Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, force (here
partial organs of power) has qualities of action and reaction, while the will to power has
the qualities of affirmation and negation.
For Deleuze, these four qualities interact and combine in four manners: activeaffirmation, active-negation, reactive-affirmation, and reactive-negation. Of these, the
reactive combinations are related to the stages of nihilism that, in Nietzsche’s On the
Genealogy of Morality, are termed ressentiment, bad conscience, and the ascetic ideal.41
Ressentiment is a reactive outgrowth that develops from pain and suffering. The ‘weak’
react to their weakness by lashing out against the noble because the weak blame the noble
40
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for their suffering. Here, ressentiment complements reactivity and negativity. Reaction is
not, however, tied to negativity. Reaction can become affirmational when it is introduced
to the priest. The priest leads the weak to see the strong as evil. This justifies ressentiment
towards the strong by adding moral criteria. Strength is signified as evil; weakness is
signified as good. The ‘weak’ move beyond a “brute state of [negative] ressentiment”
(NP 126) to affirm themselves against the strong in their weakness (an affirmative
ressentiment). There is a transition from a desire for revenge (reactive-negative) to an
actualization of revenge (reactive-affirmative). The ‘weak’ no longer wish to be noble but
proclaim their nobility in weakness. From this reactive-affirmation, the active functions
(both affirmative and negative) are blocked.
The move from negative to affirmative reaction is repeated with the notion of bad
conscience. Here, the weak no longer blame the strong for their suffering. Instead, the
weak blame themselves (i.e. I must be responsible for my pain). The priest intervenes
again, this time producing the concept of sin. One is now morally responsible for one’s
own sin. This produces an internalization of guilt that is crystalized in a cycle of sin to the
degree that one thinks of oneself as evil (because one cannot stop sinning one is
inherently evil; because one is inherently evil, one cannot stop sinning). For Nietzsche,
this comes out in Christianity where one is necessarily responsible for one’s sin. Ergo,
one is necessarily evil. As evil, one is perpetually guilty for a debt (due to sin) that cannot
be repaid. For Deleuze, bad conscience repeats ressentiment in moving from blaming
oneself for suffering (reactive-negation) to seeing oneself as evil (reactive-affirmation).
The ascetic ideal is, for Deleuze, the move from the reactive-negativity to a moralization
of guilt in reactive-positivity in both instances.
Deleuze describes the reactive affirmations as ‘false affirmation.’ This is explored
through the figure of the ass or donkey from Thus Spoke Zarathustra.42 The donkey takes
on the burden of established values, saying ‘Hee-yaw’ (yes) to everything that comes in
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its way.43 Deleuze writes, “it might be thought that the ass, the animal which says ‘Ye-a’,
was the Dionysian animal par excellence,” but this ass is not Dionysian because its yes is
false (NP 178). In saying yes to everything, the ass takes upon itself the nihilism of the
world, saying yes even to ressentiment (and saying yes to all representation of the same).
This yes is false because it cannot say no (NP 178-182). In saying yes to all that is, the
ass is incapable of bringing about new thought. It only affirms the same and reactionary.
On the other side, Deleuze suggests there is an affirmation tied to intensity and
overcoming. In contrast with the false, reactionary affirmation, this is a Dionysian
affirmation: a Dionysian yes (NP 185). Here “affirmation does not mean shouldering a
burden… Zarathustra knows that affirmation means unburdening life, making it light,
dancing and creating.”44 This affirmation is prior to the negative and can use the
negative to its purposes (an active-negative relationship). Where the ass is the caricature
of affirmation, the Dionysian yes is one that “knows how to say no: it is pure affirmation,
it has conquered nihilism and divested negation of all autonomous power. But it has done
this because it has placed the negative at the service of the powers of affirming. To affirm
is to create, not to bear, put up with or accept” (NP 185). In taking up the activeaffirmative and the active-negative, this active force produces a joyful destruction
bringing the affirmative into relationship with the eternal return.45 Both the activeaffirmative and active-negative work together in their activity to be affirmation. When
the active quality teams with the negative it is a selective negativity that works for the
power of affirmation. Through the four functions, Deleuze presents a syntax of four terms
and four combination. Yet, what is produced is not a chiasm or quadripartite, but a
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duality between active and reactive. The affirmative and negative have no power outside
of their relation to the dominant functions reactive and active. This reproduces a system
of good and bad where active is signified as good and reactive is signified as bad (even if
the negative is no longer married to the reactive). Only the active is Dionysian, the
reactive is always Apollonian. The negative and the affirmative can only follow from
these functions.
Laruelle suggests that Deleuze implements a relation of complementarity (NcH 97). In
quantum physics, complementarity is developed by Niels Bohr as a way of dealing with
incompatible information derived from a single object.46 Bohr writes this incompatible
information “can clearly not be brought into connection with each other in the usual way,
but may, as equally essential for an exhaustive account of all experience, be regarded as
‘complementary’ to each other.”47 Complementarity is an inclusive disjunction where
two or more contradictory things are, nevertheless, brought together in a complementary
relation. If one allows for a bit of anachronism, a better understanding of inclusive
disjunction can be gained from Anti-Oedipus. Deleuze and Guattari define inclusive
disjunction as “a distinction that remains disjunctive, and that still affirms the disjointed
terms, that affirms them throughout their entire distance, without restricting one by the
other or excluding the other from the one” (AO 76). Inclusive disjunction in AntiOedipus brings together two contradictory terms in an enveloped relationship where the
terms subsist as distinct and contrary individuals.48 The aspect of complementarity allows
these disjunct terms (active & negative, for instance) to complement each other despite
their contradiction to the degree that they remain simultaneously distinct and enveloped.
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For Laruelle, the Deleuzian practice is ripe full of complementarity in this fashion (as
will be seen in the third chapter through the eliding of Being49 and becoming).
Deleuze’s inclusive disjunction is distinct from Laruelle’s duplicity. The latter is a
different kind of inclusive disjunction. It is a ‘contradiction without mediation’ that
Laruelle puts forward regarding the quadripartite. This is evident from the beginning of
the book where Laruelle differentiates duplicity from both monism (as Master or Rebel)
and dualism (a mediation of Master and Rebel) because Deleuze’s inclusion
(monism=pluralism) leans heavily towards the latter (NcH 9). For Laruelle, Master and
Rebel are in a relation of duplicity rather than a dualism. This inclusive disjunction is not
described as complementarity, but as supplementarity (NcH 97).
Here the impact of Derrida—who puts forward the notion of the supplement in Of
Grammatology—is evident.50 Derrida explores the supplement in relation to presence
and absence in Rousseau’s Confessions. To protect presence of the spoken word, a
written signifier is added to a word as an image of representation. Rousseau suggests that
writing forms a dangerous supplement to speech where speech appears present in its
absence.51 Signs function as supplements (driven by techné) over nature. The issue for
Rousseau is that these supplements come to take the place of nature: the sign remains
supplement to the thing itself, something outside the thing that supplements and
supersedes the natural thing. In this suppression of nature, the supplement is dangerous.
Derrida is able to show, through Rousseau’s own work on speech, that the gesture always
operates as a sign-system alongside speech: “Gesture is here an adjunct of speech, but
this adjunct is not a supplementing by artifice, it is a re-course to a more natural, more
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expressive, more immediate sign.”52 Derrida thus suggests that speech is itself a
substitute to the sign system of gesture. Writing, as supplement to speech, is
simultaneously the anterior to speech that is interior to the production of speech. In this
way, for Derrida, the ‘logic of supplementarity’ goes against the “logic of identity and to
the principle of classical ontology” insofar as it produces a sort of paradoxical
supplement.53 This is a supplement “which would have it that the outside by inside, that
the other and the lack come to add themselves as a plus that replaces a minus, that what
adds itself to something takes the place of a default in the thing, that the default, as the
outside of the inside, should be already within the inside, etc.”54 The dangerous
supplement, an adjunction from the outside, is paradoxically internal to the generation of
what it supplements. As commentator Robert Bernasconi points out, this leads to
interesting ends in Derrida’s “Structure, Sign, and Play,” insofar as its opens up play in a
‘movement of supplementarity,’ where “One cannot determine the centre and exhaust
totalization because the sign which replaces the centre, which supplements it, taking the
centre’s place is an absence—this sign is added, occurs as a surplus, as a supplement.”55
This supplement adds something that is neither interior nor anterior, but simultaneously
(and paradoxically) both, an absence or différance that cannot be spoken but only
signified.
When Laruelle makes the distinction between Deleuze’s reading of the Nietzschean
problematic as complementarity to his own reading of it as supplementarity, he operates
with a new inclusive disjunction or ‘contradiction without mediation’ that he terms
duplicity. This duplicity is, furthermore, positioned in a position of sovereignty. For
Deleuze, the inclusive disjunction is a connection between two poles that operate
inclusively in a connected, mediated relationship. In each case, one aspect of the pole
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mediates with another: active-affirmation, active-negation, reactive-affirmation, reactivenegation. Force and will to power are an inclusive disjunction where the two sides
complement each other in various mediated relationships in a principle of noncontradiction. Signaling his own reading of the Nietzschean apparatus as
supplementarity, Laruelle suggests a unilateral relation between the two poles: one where
the rebellious supplement (rather than the complement) serves as the adjunct and absent
centre of Mastery.56
In discussing this supplementarity of the quadripartite, Laruelle distinguishes ‘of
interiority’ [d’intériorité] from ‘in interiority’ [en intériorité] with the latter operating as
supplementarity (NcH 73-74). This is an operation of Rebel in relation to Master where
Rebel is not ‘of the’ Master but is, nevertheless, interior to Mastery as a dangerous
supplement. He defines his own supplementarity as follows: “Supplementarity is this: for
the relation of these phrases, which are stupid even in Nietzsche’s text, the machinic
operations are always too rare, rare rather than absent, partial rather than rare, never
accumulating in a Body, a system or a text, irreducible partial and mismatched” (NcH
74).57 This supplementarity, now a machinic and materialist supplementarity, is a partial
or rare supplement to the text (system or Body) that is never itself a text (system or Body)
but only partial. Against the signifying textuality of the Body, it is possible to return to
the a-signifying rupture of the syntax: a syntax which is not individuated but individuates
(it is not a body, but that which determines the body).
Nietzschean propositions are understood, insofar as they can be understood (they are, for
Laruelle, a-signifying), as rebellious and partial supplement to the Master’s statement (a
signifying textuality). Returning to the four characteristics of force and will to power,
Laruelle suggests that these relations are not ontological categories, nor Heideggerian
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existentials, but what he terms différantials [différantiaux], written with an ‘a’ as in
Derridean différance (NcH 96). 58 Rebellion is the différantial or supplement of Mastery,
functioning as internal motor never subsumed within Mastery—just as the gesture is
never subsumed in the speech act. In this case, it must perpetuate itself as a-signifying,
never signified, so as to not return to or be appropriated by Mastery. This sovereignty —a
“sovereignty of Rebel over Master” (NcH 53)59— is a supplement in Mastery, produced
by the Rebel as différance and insistence of the Other. Laruelle names the sovereignty of
this power as a sovereignty of Rebel over Master.60 Rebel as dangerous supplement
insists upon Mastery as an intensive différance. Sovereignty is distinct, here, from origin
or primacy, insofar as it retains a position of supplementarity. This is to suggest that it is
determinate and generative, but in-the-last-instance, rather than as a priori.
The notion of ‘in-the-last-instance’ is raised early in the text, with Laruelle suggesting
that the unilateral movement of the syntax determines signification in-the-last-instance.
The concept of ‘determination-in-the-last-instance’ (DLI) is important to much of
Laruelle’s later work, and it is helpful to look to commentary on that work to aid in the
usage here (even if the usage does shift). In non-standard philosophy the One/Real is said
to determine philosophy in-the-last-instance. Laruelle suggests that “The DLI is not
simply an immanent causality but radical immanence itself—which distinguishes it from
every ‘Spinozistic’ immanence, or every immanence derived from Spinozism.”61 This is
an immanence that is immanent to thought itself—just as a-signification is radically
immanent to signification. He furthermore suggests that DLI is a ‘unilateral’ movement
58
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of the One/Real, as it determines philosophy. The most helpful discussion I’ve found on
this topic comes from Nick Srnicek, who writes,
The DLI therefore names the unilateral determination of philosophy by the One.
But since this is a unilateral relation, the One determines a philosophy, without
the philosophy in any way determining it. The DLI therefore forms the nonontological transcendental condition for philosophy.62
The Real determines philosophy, but this is a position of sovereignty rather than primacy,
insofar as this determination is not ontological. Thus, it is a condition, but a condition inthe-last-instance, rather than an a priori condition or an ontological condition. In other
words, it is a determination that is immanent (but not primordial) to philosophy, which
nevertheless determines from that position of immanence.
Here, sovereignty is in a unilateral position. It is again helpful to look to non-standard
philosophy, as Laruelle’s unilaterality is discussed by Katerina Kolozova in Cut of the
Real. Without at this time going too far in depth into the role of radicalization in nonstandard philosophy,63 going through Kolozova’s understanding of unilaterality is
beneficial to understanding its usage in Nietzsche contre Heidegger. Kolozova writes
“one can resort to and actively operate in his or her theorizing with the concept of
‘unilaterality’ one finds in Deleuze, but one can do it without having to ‘become a
Deleuzian’.”64 Using the non-standard philosophical practice of ‘radicalization,’
Kolozova attempts to determine (in-the-last-instance) the radical concept of the
unilateral, withdrawn from the Deleuzian oeuvre. This can be understood as an attempt to
take Deleuze’s concept, rip it from Deleuze, and explore its ramification without having
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to adopt Deleuze’s system. The term is radical because it gets to the root of the concept
without having to adopt the system as a whole. Thus, Kolozova can take Deleuze’s
concept and allow it to say something it cannot say within Deleuze’s own system. This
allows her to suggest that, within non-standard philosophy: “thought correlates
unilaterally with the (indifferent) real but does not posit it; or thought is affect by the real
or by immanence, but the real does not take the form of meaning that is inscribed upon
it.”65 Without getting into the technicalities of the relation (or lack thereof) between the
Real, One, force-(of)-thought, etc., within the non-philosophical ‘system,’ what is useful
here is the way that thought is said to operate unilaterally. What Kolozova does is present
Deleuzian unilaterality as the affirmation of the perpetual unfolding of aporias.66 Her
analysis presents a similar critique to that given in Laruelle’s Philosophies of Difference,
wherein he denounces the ‘philosophies of difference’ for mixing the aporia under a
single term (i.e. for Deleuze, difference is in a unilateral position to Being, mixing Being
and becoming). What Kolozova suggests is the unilateral move is the action of singularity
that is non-relational. Non-relational, here, meaning that there is no reciprocity between
the two parts in the relation insofar as the act only cuts one way: only the singularity cuts
the field of identities, the identities cannot cut the singularity. This process of
unilateralization can give a more solid foundation for the duplicity of the Nietzsche cut
that operates through a sovereign, unilateral non-relation with the Master.
The unilateral relation of Rebel, as sovereign supplement interior in (but not of) Mastery,
is termed duplicity. Duplicity is neither monism (either…or) nor dualism (both..and), but
a différantial, supplementary relation (or non-relation). Laruelle designates duplicity as
“a type of universal selection formulated as inclusive disjunction (contradiction without
mediation): the Master assimilates the Rebel […] but the active Rebel distinguishes
herself from the Master, refuses to be recognized as defeated or to posit an image of
herself” (NcH 19).67 The relationship of Master and Rebel is not mediated, for any
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« Duplicité désigne alors un type de rapport universel formulable comme disjonction inclusive
(contradiction sans médiation) : le Maître s’assimile le Rebelle, se l’approprie ou l’inclut par la loi et la
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mediation would return the Rebel to Mastery (as the mediation would form an
inscription). Instead, Master attempts to mediate and inscribe the Rebel under a form of
Mastery as signification while the Rebel remains indistinct and a-signifying: absent to the
Master’s presence. But, this indistinction goes further than this relationship: Rebel is
indistinct even to the Rebel because the Rebel resists all signification through asignification. This is a withdrawal from identity because the Rebel exists in a capacity
without identity as différantial. Duplicity operates two poles and four characteristics
within this a-signifying chiasm. Laruelle states this problematic “does not contain any
term, any essence, but only the networks of duplicity and chiasm" (NcH 33).68 Rejecting
Mastery, this duplicity is contrary to any and all totalization. Affirmed in the affirmation
of duplicity is not an affirmation of a totality, but an affirmation of the a-signifying that is
indeterminate from the perspective of Mastery and totality: duplicity is without presence;
it is only ever partial (NcH 127).
Considering the above, it is useful to turn to the third thesis of NcH, where Laruelle
suggests, “Nietzsche puts the Master and Rebel in a relation of duplicity rather than
duality. He liquidates the opposition of monism (philosophy of Master or Rebel) and of
dualism (contradictory mediation of Master and Rebel)” (NcH 9).69 What occurs in the
duplicitous movement of this intensive différance is thus twofold. Not only is there a
duplicity of Master and Rebel, but a duplicity that extends between monism and dualism.
Here, Laruelle does not make Nietzsche a thinker of ‘either..or’ nor ‘both…and,’ but
instead suggests that Nietzsche’s duplicity is the a-signifying production of the decision
between monism, dualism, and any other possibility. Duplicity is not a connection of both
terms into a single term, nor a selection between the two terms. Duplicity is, rather, a
withdrawing from the dualism to the internal generation: a supplement of the dualism. It

grâce réunies, mais le Rebelle actif se distingue, lui, du Maître, refuse de se reconnaître comme vaincu ou
de poser une image de lui-même » (NcH 19).
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« La Coupure nietzschéenne ne contient aucun terme, aucune essence, mais seulement des rapports de
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« Nietzsche met le Maître et le Rebelle dans un rapport de duplicité plutôt que de dualité. Il liquide
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du Maître et du Rebelle) » (NcH 9).
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would be to suggest that if this is a ‘new image of thought’ it is so in the sense that it is an
image that projects nothing beyond partial objects: not quite absence and not quite
presence, but a supplement that is neither…nor, a subtraction or reduction from these
ideas.
It is now possible to turn to briefly turn to Laruelle’s claim that “Nazis are Nietzschean,
but Nietzsche is not a Nazi,” (NcH 51)70 with an understanding of Nietzsche’s weak
identity as a-signifying Rebel. This is to suggest that the Nazi reading of Nietzsche is the
product of signification that is produced by the a-signifying chiasm of Nietzsche. The
Nazi reading of Nietzsche is produced by Nietzsche insofar as Nietzsche is the asignifying, immanent operator of production. The Nazis take up Nietzsche as a figure of
signification—producing a textual reading of Nietzsche that brings Nietzsche into their
fold. For Laruelle, one can use a citation from Nietzsche to prove whatever one wants,
insofar as it emphasizes the role of signification. This is true even of the Nazi reading.
Yet, for Laruelle, Nietzsche remains without identity (there is no Nietzsche-in-itself).
Thus, the Nazi reading of Nietzsche, while Nietzschean in a textual or signifying sense,
fails to produce Nietzsche in totality, insofar as it places Nietzsche on the side of Master
and Fascism by attempting to make it a totality. Thus, the Nazi Nietzsche is a false
totality. This is not merely an issue for the vulgar fascistic reading of Nietzsche but
extends to those ‘defenders’ of Nietzsche against the Nazi interpretation. Those attempts
to defend Nietzsche against the Nazis also fall into the realm of signification, with the
attempt to produce a Nietzschean totality through textual interpretation. Rather than
signify Nietzsche in a new totality or a new Mastery, Laruelle proclaims that “it is better
to re-affirm in Nietzsche what can be said, the position of a politics directed against all
Mastery” (NcH 141-142).71 The quadripartite’s role in this Nietzschean problematic is
the power of a-signification, duplicity, supplementarity, and unilaterality against all
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« Les défenseurs de Nietzsche sont parfois si profondément compris par ses adversaires qu’il vaut mieux
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politique dirigée contre toute Maîtrise » (NcH 141-142).

21
forces of Mastery and all works of signification that attempt to dominate thought. It is
from this ‘position,’ as a partial, a-signifying organ of power, that Nietzsche becomes a
fascist thinker for better defeating fascism: not simply a particular vulgar fascism, but the
fascism of dogmatic thought itself. The goal is, thus, freeing thought from domination
without subsequently dominating thought, allowing thought to think, producing a nonstandard thought.
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Chapter 2

2

Laruelle’s Intensive Machinic Materialism

Building on the previous chapter’s consideration of the problematic as an a-signifying
chiasm or quadripartite, this chapter explores the machinic, materialist, and intensive
attributes of the problematic. It begins by exploring the generation of a machinic
materialism via a continent of politics: A continent involving a political materialism
(duplicitous supplementarity) and a machinic materialism (intensive and libidinal
operation). To do this, Laruelle’s work on the continent of politics is put in conversation
with Louis Althusser’s continent of history. This is followed by a discussion on the use of
the machinic unconscious as it is developed by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus
before examining how Laruelle adopts and alters this concept. This conversation situates
the machinic in contrast to both techné and physis. This leads to the distinction between
Foucault’s work on the statement [énoncés] and Laruelle’s discussion of Nietzschean
propositions on the basis of a materialist critique. Finally, a discussion on the intensive
aspects of this machinic unconscious, including the development of différantials (from
the first chapter) are put forward as not merely Derridean différance, but as a
supplementary synthesis of Deleuze’s materialist and intensive difference (as outlined in
Difference and Repetition), with this différance. Through this, the chapter continues to
develop the machinic materialism of the Nietzschean problematic as the operator or
determination of identity/signification/textuality.

2.1 The continent of politics and three theses of machinic
materialism
Laruelle suggests that the Nietzschean Rebel submits to “a whole other Spaltung, nonsymbolic, a-signifying, that is to say intensive and machinic"(NcH 56).72 What is meant
by machinic and intensive? Laruelle is constantly referring to the problematic syntax as
machinic and propositional, with the machinic element being central to the generation of
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« à une tout autre Spaltung, non-symbolique, a-signifiante, c’est-à-dire intensive et machinique. » (NcH
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identity and signification that occurs from the a-signifying syntax.73 Recall from earlier,
Nietzsche is a problem or problematic of signification: he is not an identity, but the
immanent generator of identity.
While the first chapter of Nietzsche contre Heidegger introduces theses on the chiasm or
quadripartite, the second chapter opens with theses on the continent of politics. The term
‘continent’ is a play on Louis Althusser’s conception of a ‘continent of history’ in the
essay “Philosophy as Revolutionary Weapon.”74 In this essay, Althusser envisions the
history of thought as developing through the opening of continents: first Plato with a
continent of mathematics, then Descartes’ continent of physics, followed by Marx’s
continent of history. Each opens up a revolution in thought due to an epistemic break in
the production of knowledge. According to Althusser: “like the other breaks which
opened up the other two continents that we know, this break inaugurates a history which
will never come to an end.”75 Furthermore, the influence of Althusser can be seen in the
development of a Nietzschean problematic in relation to his Marxist problematic (which
is discussed in chapter 3). Althusser’s continent of History is said to be enveloped in the
Marxist problematic that is put forward in For Marx. It should be noted that the terms
problematic and epistemological break are not Althusser’s own, but are borrowed from
Jacques Martin and Gaston Bachelard respectively. Via Martin, the problematic is used
to,
...designate the particular unity of a theoretical formation and hence the location
to be assigned to this specific difference, [while] the concept of an
‘epistemological break’ from Gaston Bachelard [is used] to designate the
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mutation in the theoretical problematic contemporary with the foundation of a
scientific discourse.76
Within the Althusserian schema, this break occurs squarely within signification insofar as
it is a break from one signified epistemology to another within history. The Nietzschean
problematic, implemented by Deleuze and Laruelle, is a political rupture rather than a
historical break: it is not bound to history or signification, but constitutes an a-signifying
rupture that is a-historical.77
In suggesting that Nietzsche opens a continent of Politics, Laruelle signals an epistemic
rupture. This allows for the possibility of producing new thought in the political realm,
just as Althusser signals a new historical continent in Marx. According to the fourth
thesis of NcH, “Marx discovers the continent of history, but Nietzsche invents the
continent of politics... it implies a new definition of the political” (NcH 21).78 The clever
eliding of ‘discovery’ for ’invention’ fits in the consideration of Nietzsche as a process
rather than individual: Nietzsche is the process who makes possible this new political: a
operative politics that is a-signifying, machinic, and intensive.79
Just as the continent of history operates through dialectical materialism and historical
materialism, the Nietzschean continent of politics contains its own internal process of
development. These processes are introduced by Laruelle in the 3rd chapter as political
materialism and machinic materialism. Laruelle writes: “Nietzsche invents in a latent
manner, a new discipline that is called ‘political materialism,’ destined to occupy and
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replace the position of ‘historical materialism.’... It provides a material determination in
the last instance: the libido. It provides its ‘laws,’ syntaxes or articulations: it is not
dialectic, and supposes a new concept of contradiction. One called ‘machinic’” (NcH
31).80 Political materialism is expanded upon with the introduction of a ‘machinic
materialism’ that builds upon dialectic materialism as a discipline ‘correlative and
complementary to’ political materialism. It is defined as follows: "it examines in its
generality the problems relative to complex relations of power, of the libido, of their
modes of articulation: of material and its ‘laws’”(NcH 31).81 Together, political and
machinic materialism designate the continent of politics in the Nietzschean problematic,
where the supplementarity (political materialism) of the libidinal forces and complex
relations of power (machinic materialism) displace history and the economy in Marx’s
formulation (NcH 32). Anthony Paul Smith’s commentary suggests that Laruelle, “reads
Nietzsche as a machinic materialist by thinking him with Marx, with a dialectical
materialism and historical materialism becoming political materialism and machinic
materialism.”82 Following Smith’s analysis, it is notable that Laruelle’s designation is
not contra Marx in any traditional sense. This is put forward quite clearly in a collision of
Nietzsche and Mao that is presented in the seventh chapter:
The political critique of Nietzsche consists in making ‘work’ the Eternal Return of
the Same [ERS] and Will to Power [WP] and their syntax in the most diverse
fields: for example effectuating the ERS/WP in investigating the problems of
theory and play in economic or military strategy; or within the theory of
generative grammar. Or operating as a fusion (a différantial fusion) of the
ERS/WP with the phenomenology of Marxism. Nietzsche and Mao: one against
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the other, one with the other… the contradictory différantial fusion of Nietzsche
thought with historical materialism as a (theoretical and practical) discursive
formation. (NcH 82)83
The différantial fusion produces a contradiction without mediation between Mao and
Marx. The contradiction is not a negation nor a mediation of the two sides, but instead a
relation of duplicity. In this relation of duplicity, the Nietzschean problematic element, as
différantial supplement, operates unilaterally upon Maoist thought, producing a more
reflexive or ‘plastic’ political formulation.84
Considering the above, it is integral to consider the concept of machinic. Laruelle
borrows this term from Anti-Oedipus, claiming “if [this term] had not be introduced in
Anti-Oedipus, [it] would need to have been invented for strategic reasons” (NcH 105).85
It is helpful to draw upon that text in unpacking this element. Anti-Oedipus opens with a
discussion on what Deleuze and Guattari term ‘desiring machines.’86 Positing machines
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as ‘desiring’ provides an entry into the discussion of machinic materialism as libidinal.
Deleuze and Guattari reject a Lacanian understanding of desire as lack. In his
commentary on Anti-Oedipus, Eugene Holland writes, “Deleuze and Guattari draw
inspiration from Nietzschean affirmation: desire, they insist does not lack anything... On
the contrary, desire is first and foremost productive force, and what it produces is simply
the real world.”87 Holland’s insertion of Nietzsche is notable, insofar as Nietzsche
largely takes a back seat in Deleuze’s work with Guattari. In A Thousand Plateaus,
Deleuze and Guattari go even so far as to call Nietzsche a thinker of arborescence.88
Nevertheless, there is reason for Holland’s connection (one that Laruelle makes as well,
given his insistence on the relationship between Nietzsche and the machinic). Evidence
for this connection can be gathered from a number of texts written between Difference
and Repetition and Anti-Oedipus. In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze defines the will to
power as a ‘Dionysian machine,’ suggesting some relationship between the machinic and
Nietzsche.89 Furthermore, in the proceedings for the conference Nietzsche aujourd’hui,
which Deleuze convened in 1972 (the same year as the publication of Anti-Oedipus), he
describes Nietzsche in terms of an ‘absolute encoding’ that is nevertheless ‘not
encodable.’90 At this point Nietzsche remains an affirmative operation that both decodes
and encodes. The usage of Nietzsche in these later writings is similar to the conception of
the machinic unconscious raised in Anti-Oedipus. It follows that the affirmative

and is capable of explaining the process theoretically. Something is produced: the effects of a machine, not
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properties in Nietzsche are reproduced in the affirmative properties of the machinic
unconscious. Desiring is a real, affirmative process of machines which, through this
desire, produce. Desire is not anterior to the ’machinic’ but is the very process of the
machine: “Desire and its object are one and the same thing: the machine, as a machine of
a machine. Desire is a machine and the object of desire is another machine connected to
it” (AO 26). To be machinic is to desire and to produce. Machinic materialism is, for
Deleuze and Guattari, and act of desiring production: a connective affirmative desire.
Like Deleuze and Guattari, Laruelle understands this process as affirmative, but he again
draws upon the concept of the supplement, placing this affirmation not in an inclusive
contradiction to negativity, but in a relation of supplementarity to negativity and
positivity. Laruelle suggests that there are three affirmations of the machinic process,
introduced as the three theses of machinic materialism. Each thesis assumes the others,
and they must be taken together. The first thesis, titled “Materialist or Libidinal Thesis,”
introduces machinic materialism as libidinal and materialist. For Deleuze and Guattari,
the “libido is the connective ‘labor’ of desiring production” (AO 13). It is without need of
mediation or sublimation, libido is “only desire and the social, and nothing else” (AO
38). The libido is the energy of production. Holland suggests that Deleuze and Guattari
connect the Freudian libido with Marxist labor power through the use of desiring
machines: bringing together what they term social production (labor power) and desiring
production (libidinal power).91 Desiring production (a libidinal production) is an
unconscious operation of the molecular, which, through the syntheses of connection,
disjunction and conjunction, produces or actualizes the molar.92 This desiring production
is a transcendental force that operates unilaterally upon the molar.
The libido retains this position as unconscious process: “the libido, as machinic, operates
below/beyond [en-deçà/au-delà] all natural or technical energy, there is not a scientific
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concept ideologically transposed on a philosophical category” (NcH 123).93 This again
uses the notion of supplement, insofar as he places the libidinal production (of the will to
power) in a position that is outside both natural and technical. Earlier in the text, he
makes explicit that will to power is in a position of alterity to physis and techne,
suggesting it is anti-Nietzschean to signify the will to power as either: “The antiNietzschean critique confounds ’will to power‘ with a natural energy, again with an
energy mastered technically [...] It dodges the opposition of nature and law relating to
that which constitutes a supplementarity and a process of production...” (NcH 45).94 As
Biswas Mellamphy points out in her own discussion, this is not a prioritization of logos to
physis either. The libido is a supplement anterior to logos, physis, and techne.95 Laruelle
presents this as a critique of both Heidegger and Deleuze insofar as Heidegger reduces
will to power to the technical process and Deleuze and Guattari reduce it to a natural
energy.96 Nevertheless, the libidinal position is retained as supplement to the natural and
the technical. It is as an unconscious operation below or beyond; operating unilaterally as
a transcendental force.
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« Puisque la libido comme machinique fonctionne en-deçà/au-delà de toute énergétique naturelle ou
technique, il n’y a pas ici de concept scientifique transposé en catégorie philosophique » (NcH 123).
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« La critique anti-nietzschéenne confond la « Volonté de puissance » avec une énergie naturelle, donc
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95

“Although Nietzsche uses the term physio-logy, he does not privilege logos (speech, human reason) over
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Mellamphy, “Nietzsche: The Engine of Politics,” 149. For Biswas Mellamphy, the lack of prioritization is
crucial given her reading of Nietzschean physio-logy. Her consideration of physis as privileged to logos
should be as a genetic sovereignty, rather than a primacy.
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claims a naturalism. Deleuze goes through pains in Nietzsche and Philosophy to distinguish mechanistic
from machinic, with the latter operating beyond the mere mechanistic properties and being endowed with
the will to power as a generative force that is problematic to naturalism. Even if Deleuze and Guattari
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machinic with a naturalism, but to suggest that both man and nature are driven by same processes of
desiring machines: This is most clearly indicated through the body without organs as a “body without an
image” or ‘antiproduction,’ and in this sense an identity without an image (or identity without identity).
(AO 4-5)
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A second thesis, on the “Syntactic or Machinic in the narrow sense,” understands this
libidinal process as a syntax. This thesis works to introduce Derridean différance as a
supplement to the unconscious forces of desiring production. Laruelle writes,
The ERS/WP problematic contains a thesis relating to the syntax, machinic thesis
or différantial, which introduces a new concept of production, reproduction and
consumption. It poses the ‘primacy’ of an active-affirmative différance over the
contradiction by the differential form (Althusser) or by negativity which remains,
both from representation. (NcH 125)97
With the Deleuze-Guattarian rupture of desire as lack, negativity no longer holds the
power of production: desiring-production strips negativity of its productive power.
Nevertheless, the affirmation posited by Laruelle is not a contradiction of or in opposition
to negativity. Rather, as expressed above, negativity is the opposite of positivity.
Affirmation, in Laruelle, is the supplement that is anterior to both positivity and
negativity.98 For Laruelle, différance comes to take the vacant position left by negativity
in the move from dialectical materialism to political materialism. Thus, where negativity
was the force of production in dialectical materialism, political materialism grants that
position to an affirmative différance. Political materialism places the libidinal operation
in a place of supplementarity. Laruelle places this alongside the Deleuzian oeuvre,
suggesting that this affirmation is the “affirmation of the primacy of becoming over
Being (over presence and absence), the subordination of lack and the negative to the
Other as différance, which affirms the primacy of the material over representation” (NcH
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« …la problématique E.R.M./V.P. contient une thèse portant sur la syntaxe, thèse machinique ou
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125).99 As in Deleuze, Laruelle institutes this transcendental operation in a primacy over
representation (the image of thought, or Mastery); the libidinal, a-signifying motor that
generates signification. Again, this position—with the motor of différance replacing the
negative motor of dialectical materialism—is not a negation of dialectical materialism,
but a displacement and transformation that continues the Marxist form in a new light
(NcH 126).
The third thesis, “Machinic Thesis in the broad sense or the Functional Synthesis of
Sovereignty,” brings into the conversation the already discussed principle of sovereignty.
This thesis signals a “hierarchy without presence, without the mediation of generalities of
representation” (NCH 126-127).100 The position différance takes in relation to
representation—the position the Rebel takes in relation to Mastery—is a hierarchical one.
This would appear a contradiction, insofar as the hierarchy of différance over
representation would seem to imply a new domination. Laruelle’s aim is to get past this
contradiction through his use of duplicity and supplementarity. He does this by instituting
the relation of différance to representation not as a primacy (as the second thesis would
imply) but as a sovereignty: “A non-metaphysical or non-representational hierarchy, the
hierarchy of inclusive disjunction or duplicity, also without presence” (NcH 127).101 The
third thesis, then, institutes a sovereignty of the first thesis over the second, insofar as the
libidinal thesis institutes a reduction from hierarchical domination in the traditional sense.
Laruelle puts forward an understanding of the first two thesis in the production of the
third:
This hierarchy of inclusion affirms the sovereignty of the materialist thesis over
the syntactical thesis, of the libidinal thesis over the machinic thesis. But in such a
way that, as indicated in the first thesis, the second (dominated) thesis contributes
99

« …l’affirmation de la primauté du devenir sur l’Être (sur la présence et l’absence), la subordination du
manque et du négatif à l’Autre comme différance, que l’affirmation de la primauté de la matière sur la
représentation » (NcH 126).
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« … hiérarchie sans présence, sans la médiation des généralités de la représentation » (NcH 126-127).

« une hiérarchie non-métaphysique ou non-représentative, la hiérarchie d’une inclusion disjonctive ou
d’une duplicité elle aussie sans présence… » (NcH 127).
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to (circle) an intrinsic determination of the first (at once its means and effect),
while this affirms the becoming-material or libidinal of syntaxes. (NcH 127)102
Différance is a libidinal operation; sovereign but not primary. The cut does not precede
representation but is nevertheless in a position of sovereignty to the representation that it
cuts; it determines what it cuts in-the-last-instance. It should be recognized that Laruelle
closes his discussion of this thesis with an addendum, suggesting that différance can be
placed alongside both first and second thesis: “the first thesis (différance as politicallibidinal material around which production turns) than the second (différance as nonspecific and non-technical cut, but machinic, of the libido)” (NcH 128).103 In Laruelle’s
understanding, différance is not an identity but the Nietzschean rupture of signification,
wherein the syntax of the eternal return and will to power breaks with the representational
forces of signification.

2.2 The principle of reduction used to distinguish machines
from mechanisms and propositions from statements.
Laruelle agrees with Deleuze and Guattari that the machinic is not mechanistic. In AntiOedipus the mechanistic is tied to the mechanism of a molar structure, while the
machinic is in an operation on the molecular or unconscious (AO 40). In a break from
Lacan, they insist that “the unconscious itself is no more structural than personal, it does
not symbolize any more than it imagines or represents; it engineers, it is machinic.
Neither imaginary nor symbolic, it is the Real in itself, the ‘impossible real’ and its
production” (AO 53). While a coherent definition of ‘machinic,’ in contrast to the
mechanistic, is never given in Anti-Oedipus, the introduction of Guattari’s The Machinic
Unconscious does provide some help: “why stick this label of ‘machinic unconscious’
102

« Cette hiérarchie d’inclusion affirme la souveraineté de la thèse matérialiste sur la thèse syntaxique,
de la thèse libidinale sur la thèse machinique. Mais de telle sorte que, comme l’indique la formulation de la
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103

« …bien la première thèse (la différance comme matérialité politico-libidinale autour de laquelle tourne
la production) que la seconde (la différance comme coupure non-spécifique et non-technique, mais
machinique, de la libido) » (NcH 128).
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onto it? Simply to stress that it is populated not only with images and words, but also
with all kinds of machinisms that lead it to produce and reproduce these images and
words.”104 Deleuze, too, gives a more coherent definition in work produced without
Guattari. In his conversations with Claire Parnet, he provides a summary that
distinguishes machinic from mechanism and gives credence to the logic of machinic as
operational:
Machine, machinism, 'machinic': this does not mean either mechanical or
organic. Mechanics is a system of closer and closer connections between
dependent terms. The machine by contrast is a 'proximity' grouping between
independent and heterogeneous terms (topological proximity is itself independent
of distance or contiguity). What defines a machinic assemblage is the shift of a
centre of gravity along an abstract line. As in Kleist's marionette, it is this shift
which gives rise to actual lines or movements. It may be said that the machine, in
this sense, points to the unity of a machine operator. But this is wrong: the
machine operator is present in the machine, 'in the centre of gravity', or rather of
speed, which goes through him. That is why it is useless to say that certain
movements are impossible for the machine - on the contrary, these are the
movements such a machine makes because one of its parts is a man… The
machine is a proximity grouping of man-tool-animal-thing. It is primary in
relation to them since it is the abstract line which crosses them and makes them
work together. It is always astride several structures, as in Tinguely's
constructions. The machine, in requiring the heterogeneity of proximities, goes
beyond the structures with their minimum conditions of homogeneity. A social
machine always comes first in relation to the men and animals it takes into its
'stock'.105
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In this definition, the machine can be read, in part, as the libidinal complementary of an
assemblage.106 The machinic is not merely a series of mechanisms operating between
organs, but it is the internal generator or genetic operation that puts the organs in place.
The machinic materialism precedes both identity and the mechanisms between identities.
As suggested in the first synthesis of machinic materialism, Deleuze’s distinction of
machinic to mechanistic is extended to the technical. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that
the machinic unconscious is distinct from the “social, technical relation to the men and
animals it takes into its 'stock'… [‘and to the ] organic,’ which are of a molar order, while
the machinic is of the molecular order” (AO 286, 289). Machinic materialism is of the
molecular unconscious, generating molar structures. The technical, the social, the
organic, the signifying, the textual, etc., are all molar. This distinction is important for
Laruelle, insofar as the technical is a representation (NcH 104). Again, the machinic
operating in a supplementary and sovereign relation to the opposition of physis and
techné: the machinic is the “politically intrinsic libidinal or Relations of power,
becoming the material determined-determinate [déterminante-déterminée] of the
political” (NcH 105).107 Machinic is not technical, mechanical, or natural, but ruptures
these categories as unconscious, a-signifying, libidinal, and material. In a position of
sovereignty, the machinic materialism determines these identities.
Considering this distinction, it is also useful to understand how Laruelle distinguishes
machinic materialism as a Nietzschean proposition from Foucauldian statements
[énoncés]. This distinction is notable for Laruelle’s understanding of Nietzsche’s use of
the aphorism.108 Laruelle states, “Nietzsche emits real propositions with a determined
106

Though, against Laruelle’s reading of Deleuze’s structure as one of complementarity, the abstract line
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“speed, which goes through.”
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« la libido déviant intrinsèquement politique ou Rapports de pouvoir, devient la matière déterminantdéterminée de la politique » (NcH 105).
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And, at least to some degree, the distinction between the Althusserian rendering of Marx’s problematic
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syntax that cannot be reduced to a logico-grammatical syntax nor a speculative
articulation” (NcH 70).109 He suggests that these propositions [propositions] are distinct
from what Foucault, in The Archaeology of Knowledge, calls statements. Foucault takes
great care in defining statements. He makes clear that statements are distinct from the
discourses they relate to, as he includes a long explanation for why statements are
difficult to define in the first place. He does suggest that the statement is in some way an
‘atom’ of a discourse, but that this is an insufficient explanation. A few pages later, he
provides something of a negative definition: “the statement is not the same kind of unit as
the sentence, the proposition, or the speech act; it cannot be referred, therefore, to the
same criteria; but neither is it the same kind of unit as a material object, with its limits
and independence.”110 Foucault continues to suggest that the statement is neither material
nor linguistic, and that it is not a structure of the discourse. It is instead:
A function of existence that properly belongs to signs and on the basis of which
one may then decide, through analysis or intuition, whether or not they ‘make
sense,’ according to what rule they follow one another or are juxtaposed, of what
they are the sign, and what sort of act is carried out by the formulation (oral or
written). One should not be surprised, then, if one has failed to find structural
criteria of unity for the statement; this is because it is not in itself a unit, but a
function that cuts across a domain of structures and possible unities, and which
reveals them, with concrete contents, in time and space.111

Althusser. Althusser himself suggests that Foucault’s notion of episteme is indebted to Althusser’s use of
the problematic, writing, “As for Foucault, the uses he explicitly or implicitly makes of the concept of
‘break’ and ‘problematic’ are echoes either of Bachelard, or of my own systematic ‘use’ of Bachelard (as
far as ‘break’ is concerned) and of what I owe to my unfortunate friend Martin (for ‘problematic’)” in
Louis Althusser, For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: The Penguin Press, 1969), 287. Given that the
terms are at least in the same area of theory, the displacement of Foucault’s concept may be helpful in the
displacement of the Althusserian one.
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The statement remains a function of signification, even if it is not reducible to
signification. In an essay on Foucault, Deleuze describes statements: “A statement always
represents a transmission of particular elements distributed in a corresponding space. As
we shall see, the formations and transformations of these spaces themselves pose
topological problems that cannot adequately be described in terms of creation, beginning,
or foundation.”112 According to Deleuze, the statement functions as the transmission of a
regularity: “it represents, not an average, but rather the whole statistical curve.”113
Deleuze conceives of statements as multiplicities that are distinguished by thresholds: a
new statement ruptures the threshold of the old as epistemic break. It is on this basis that
Laruelle suggests that Deleuze affirms Foucauldian statements. The difference Laruelle
puts forward between statement a proposition can then be generated as such: the
proposition exists as sovereign to both statement and signification, no matter the
relationship between statement and signification.
Laruelle acknowledges Deleuze’s reading of statement as multiplicity but renders these
multiplicities as produced by the Nietzschean syntax. He suggests that this syntax is the
“condition of other syntaxes, in particular of the distribution of the singular points of the
statement, or of the statements between them” (NcH 71).114 This distinction is notable
given that, for Foucault, the statement is not merely textual, even if it is said to belong to
signs. To give a simplistic account, statements can be understood as the ‘atom of
discourse’ even if not reducible to that position.115 A distinction between the
Nietzschean proposition and the Foucauldian statement can be situated in the distinction
between ‘in interiority’ and ‘of interiority’ raised in chapter one. Here the statement
operates as an interiority that belongs to the discourse—a complementary attribute (of
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interiority) while the proposition (as problematic syntax) operates in interiority to the
statement and discourse, but as a supplement. Nevertheless, this distinction is not
sufficient for differentiating the statement and the proposition, as the latter has yet to be
defined.
Laruelle suggests that the Nietzschean text does not give statements in a typical sense,
but,
…consists precisely in producing and reproducing statements, phrases, texts, in
the form of this complex syntax and reduces [réduire] (=critique) only their
semantic, formal, stylistic, and judicative (discursive) properties, to the least
ideological reflection of their properties in the definition of the being-Nietzschean
or machinic-materialist (NcH 71).116
The notion of reduction is central to this analysis. The différantial is not an expansion
from the syntax, but a reduction or withdrawal from the ideological. In a move
foreshadowing the non-standard philosophical practice of radicalization to a generic
identity, the Nietzschean proposition is the reduction of the statement from its ideological
properties: Nietzschean propositions are the generic reduction of the statement.
It is useful to again turn to Laruelle’s later work to expand on this notion of
radicalization. This can provide a better understanding of the process of the reduction to
its generic condition. Radicalization was mentioned in the first chapter, insofar as the
concept of the unilateral in Laruelle is a radicalization of Deleuze’s concept of the
unilateral, and it is worth continuing along that example. Katerina Kolozova explains
radicalization as the attempt to explain the inner ‘working of the real’ that reside behind
(as syntax) the “transcendental material or philosophical chôra that thought operates
with.”117 The process of radicalization takes up that philosophical material and attempts
116
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to radicalize it by withdrawing it from the philosophical system of which it is apart. This
is an attempt to understand the syntax determining those materials in-the-last-instance:
For example, one can resort to and actively operate in his or her theorizing with
the concept of ‘unilaterality’ one finds in Deleuze, but one can do it without
having to ‘become a Deleuzian’ and use it only in ways that are determined by
Deleuze’s system (or ‘organized thought’) as presented in Difference ad
Repetition and his other works. In order to accomplish this, one has to ‘radicalize’
the term, that is, reduce it to its ‘transcendental minimum’ or to the conceptual
content that describes the workings of the real that have necessitated it (the
concept), to its determination in the last instance. In order to arrive to the radical
concept, thought has to correlate only with the real and in an immanent way [de la
manière immanente] rather than with the entire conceptual apparatus of a school
of thinking.118
The concept of unilaterality is determined (unilaterally, one might add) by the Real, but
does not reciprocally mediate the Real. Insofar as this concept is unilaterally determined
by the Real, it is generically reduced from the larger philosophical system of thought in
which it is instituted, and instead able to be used as a (fictional) tool withdrawn from that
system of thought.
Yet, one does not need to go to the later work to consider the genericity of statements.
Even here in Nietzsche contre Heidegger, Laruelle suggests that the statement bears,
simultaneously, “on the one hand an individuality and on the other, a generality of a
generic type” (NcH 78).119 The statement is not signifying but withdrawn from its
position in signification. A distinction can be made between the statement as text and its
reduction to a machinic proposition:
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More simply the productive and critical reading of the Nietzschean ’text’ implies
that one knows how to operate the distinction of a descriptive phrase or a
judgement from a machinic proposition (the critique [or reduction] of Nietzsche
in their ideological appearance); that one can distinguish, of a traditional
evaluation of Nietzsche’s texts, and a true, Nietzschean and machinic evaluation.
(NcH 72)120
The productive reading of the Nietzschean text does not treat the text as an ideological
structure. Instead, it reduces the text from the ideological structure of the text, treating the
text as a generic and non-ideological proposition (withdrawn from the ideological
statement). The work is condensed in the internal, différantial syntax that generates both
statement and proposition.
Considering the above, the critical reading of Nietzsche, via Laruelle, is the reduction of
statements to propositions, providing an understanding of Nietzsche’s text as aphoristic.
Aphorisms, read as non-ideological, are propositions developed through the syntax.
Laruelle notes “the actual production and destruction of statements or propositions,
finally condensing in the ‘canonical’ or ‘invariant’ syntax… is the internal ‘law’ of the
aphorism” (NcH 76).121 In other words, he is suggesting that the proper reading of
Nietzsche is not an examination of the text as such—as ideological product—but an
exploration of the aphorism as a reduction from ideology: one that develops out of the
Nietzschean problematic/syntax. Aphorism is reduced from the ideological and is
understood as immanent to (but not of) the ideological. Under Laruelle’s schema, the
aphorism is a relation of transversality, not a principle of verticality or transcendence
(NcH 87). Aphorisms are always home to the transversality of the syntactical problematic
that rumbles beneath its surface, cutting and reducing. Laruelle writes that the syntax “in
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the aphorism is not mixed, a representation, a qualitative (generic or specific) generality,
precisely because it is a strictly ‘individualized’ and irreducible partial generality” (NcH
88).122 What appears is a relationship between reading the aphorism as non-ideological
and generic to an act of discerning the a-signifying syntax through the reduction of
statement to proposition.

2.3 On the attribute of intensity
Even with some definition of the machinic and proposition in place, an understanding of
these processes as materialist remains opaque. The most obvious point of reference is the
relationship with historical and dialectical materialism, which serve as the basis for
political and machinic materialism respectively. While these terms are not used by Marx,
his work in The German Ideology serves as a basis for the materialist consideration of
history. The premise for this materialism comes out of its contrast to German Idealism:
In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth,
here is a matter of ascending from earth to heaven. That is to say, not of setting
out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of,
imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh; but setting out from
real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process demonstrating the
development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process.123
Marx rejects historical movement as ideological progression, insisting that materialist
production in the real is the driving force. Marx’s distinction fits with Laruelle’s
positioning of a-signification as sovereign to signification, with the latter playing the role
of ideological overdetermination of the real syntax, much as in Marx’s diagnosis where
the ideological overdetermines life.
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Nevertheless, given the influence of Deleuze (and Althusser) on Nietzsche contre
Heidegger, there might be something added to Marxist materialism from the Spinozist
lineage. A discussion of Spinoza is especially pertinent given the move from dialectic to
problematic.124 In Reading Capital, Althusser reads Marx through Spinoza to keep Marx
from a “classical conception of the economic object” where the economic object is
determined by something outside itself. 125 Althusser puts forward an alternative wherein
“the structure is immanent in its effects, a cause immanent in its effects in the Spinozist
sense of the term, that the whole existence of the structure consists in its effects, in short
that the structure, which is merely a specific combination of its peculiar elements, is
nothing outside its effects.”126
While, for reasons that will become clear later, it would be a mistake to suggest that
Laruelle adopts this Spinozist framework, his persistent utilization of the attribute
intensive to describe machinic materialism points to some relation with the Spinozist side
of Deleuze.127 The concept of intensity is linked to Deleuze’s interpretation of the will to
power. For Deleuze, force is mechanistic while the will to power is machinic. Will to
power is “the differential and genetic element” internal to production (NP 51). It is the
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aspect of forces that determines their interaction—the selective or evaluative element
which interprets forces, providing the evaluative or interpretive aspects of production (NP
53). Deleuze provides a Spinozist reading of Nietzsche where forces interact in dominant
and dominating relations that follow Spinoza’s understanding of the affects.128 He states
in his short book on Spinoza: “The Spinozists are... Hölderlin, Kleist, and Nietzsche,
because they think in terms of speeds and slowness, of frozen catatonias, and accelerated
movements, unformed elements, nonsubjectified affects”.129 Deleuze considers
Nietzsche as a thinker of affects—now forces, speeds and slowness—intersecting with
one another. For him, the will to power is the internal syntax or motor of these
movements. It is in these movements that the concept of intensity comes about.
A bridge can be built between Deleuze’s writings on the will to power in NP and the
concept of intensity from DR through an essay titled “Conclusions on the Will to Power
and the Eternal Return,” published in between the two texts. Deleuze states: “Nietzsche
was interested in physics as a science of intensive qualities, and ultimately he was aiming
at the will to power as an ‘intensive’ principle, as a principle of pure intensity—because
the will to power does not mean wanting power.”130 Pure intensity marks the extension of
the will to power in the Deleuzian oeuvre. In DR, Deleuze considers
Pure intensity insofar as it is implicated in that deep region where no quality is
developed, or any extensity deployed. In this case, we define energy in terms of
the difference buried in this pure intensity and it is the formula ‘difference of
intensity’ which bears the tautology, but this time the beautiful and profound
tautology of Difference. (DR 240)
Difference of intensity is pure intensity—a Spinozist and immanent production that
operates as difference in itself.
128

Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, trans. Edwin Curley. (London: Penguin, 1994), I. P27.

129

Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 129.

130

Gilles Deleuze, “Conclusions on the Will to Power and the Eternal Return” in Desert Islands and Other
Texts: 1953-1974, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004) 117128: 122.

43
The concept of intension is related to the Kantian notion of extension. In The Critique of
Pure Reason, Kant develops ‘magnitudes’ for the possibility of rationally deriving causal
relations within phenomenal conditions.131 Defining magnitudes as, “the unity of the
assembly of the manifold homogenous in thought,” Kant understands magnitudes as
phenomenal appearances.132 Extensive magnitudes are principles of the intuition or
reason, relating to mathematical axioms. They are derived via deductive reason. As such,
these magnitudes can be derived rationally, prior to real instantiation. Kant defines
extension as:
...a magnitude where the presentation of the parts makes possible (and hence

necessarily precedes) the presentation of the whole. I can present no line, no
matter how small, without drawing it in thought, i.e. without producing from one
point onward all the parts little by little and thereby tracing this intuition in the
first place.133
Extensive magnitudes are axiomatic rules that exist a priori to empirical observation.
This is expressed in “the conditions of sensible a priori intuition under which alone the
schema of a pure concept of outer appearance can come about—e.g. the axiom that is
between two points only one straight line is possible.”134 Similar to the geometrical
method of Spinoza or Descartes, extension is an a priori structure developed from the
appearance of the aggregate via rational deduction.
Intensive magnitudes develop alongside the extensive as perceptive and sensational. They
are the a posteriori in relation to the a priori. Kant places intension in relation to
131
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perception: “The principle that anticipates all perception, as such, reads thus: In all
appearances sensation as well as the real that corresponds to it in the object, has an
intensive magnitude, i.e. a degree.”135 Intension is a magnitude of degree, an appearance
of sensation rather than intuition or reason, a degree from zero.136 Kant describes it as the
magnitude of the real: an appearance that comes out of real experience, rather than
developed in the intuition. Intensity, as perceptive, follows a rationality of induction.
Extensive difference is distinct from intensive difference insofar as the former is an
absolute, abstract difference (a difference in kind) while intensive difference is a
difference in degree.
Kant recognizes both magnitudes as altered in spatio-temporal relations.137 Even the a
priori falls under the sovereignty of space and time. There is a synthetic continuity
between the two magnitudes, where changes in the Real alter the extensive properties
derived in the intuition. Nevertheless, in posing the extensive as a priori to the
real/intensive, Kant retains a hierarchical relationship of primacy between the two in their
synthetic unity. Because, for Kant, one can only measure change under the transcendental
illusion of phenomena (via the extensive magnitude of intuition), extension is not
understood as real, but it nevertheless is present as an a priori primacy over intension and
the real.138 The axiomatic conditions of extensive magnitudes render the intensive
magnitude (that is particular to the real) as immanent to (in the sense of an ‘interiority
of’) the extensive.
Retaining the principle of inclusive disjunction, one can think intension in Deleuze as the
closure of the negative. It is here that the influence of Spinoza is apparent. In The Ethics,
Spinoza conceives of an infinite substance, God, which contains all finite things. On this
basis, Deleuze introduces his equation—monism=pluralism—where a theory of the one

135

Ibid., A166, B207.

136

Ibid., A166, B208

137

Ibid., A170, B212.

138

See Adkins, “To Have Done with the Transcendental,” 536.

45
(God) is simultaneously inclusive of the plurality of beings. From the perspective of
monism there is no negation. Instead, there is only intensive change within the plurality.
This change is intensive because all modes differ only in degree, insofar as they are all
modes of God.139
Through this understanding of intensity, Deleuze aims to invert the Kantian structure by
placing intension in a place of primacy over extension. In one example this is shown
through the distinction between ordinal and cardinal numbers. Ordinal numbers are
ordered based on a spatial relation of real intension. Their numbering is a weak
abstraction that only signals where each object is placed in relation to the other objects.
Objects in a line are relayed as 1st, 2nd, and 3rd on the basis of their intensive relations.
There can be no negation here, but only a movement within the spatial coordinates,
changing the order of the numbers. Cardinal numbers are of the intuition, existing as a
strong abstraction. These include the numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, etc. Cardinal numbers are not
present in the real, but only in the intuition (DR 232-233).140 Beneath and immanent to
the docile and equalizable sameness of the cardinal lies the rumblings of a differential,
intensive ordinality: an ordinality that renders itself as the determination or problematic
of the cardinal.
Following this, it is not difficult to ascertain why Laruelle suggests that Deleuze turns the
will to power (as intensity) into a naturalism. If Deleuze does retain will to power as
naturalism, then he stays on the side of signification, insofar as physis is signification
(NcH 45). Whether or not Laruelle’s suggestion that Deleuze institutes will to power as a
naturalism is accurate, a larger rupture is at play. There is, I argue, a deeper division that
takes place on the basis of the role that Spinozist metaphysics play in the development of
intensity in Deleuze and Laruelle’s thought—with the element of supplementarity in
Laruelle signaling a rupture of the Spinozist complementarity.
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Laruelle does not explicitly define ‘intensive’ in Nietzsche contre Heidegger, but the fact
that it is perpetually raised alongside the concept of the libido and the machinic suggest
an origin in Deleuze, with the three concepts operating as attributes of the machinic
syntax of the will to power/eternal return. As in Deleuze’s work, intensity is the
productive force in desiring production. It is put into conversation with the libido: “libido
as intensive: It's the fluctuation or oscillation of the libido when it goes through the circle
of the ERS or of affirmation, the circle of jouissance, or rarely, decidedly narrow, even
entangled in the primary repression” (NcH 117).141 This is as close to a definition as
Laruelle gives. Nevertheless, it is possible to put forward an understanding of Laruellean
intensity on the basis of the other principles put forward thus far. In Deleuze, intensity
develops through a Spinozist ontology where the monistic is in a complementary
inclusive disjunction with the pluralistic.142 Here, the pluralistic is said to differ only in
intensity, insofar as it is of the monistic. For Laruelle, there is a rejection of this
complementarity for a supplementarity (as is explored in chapter 1). Laruelle’s use of
supplementarity and différantial ruptures the Deleuzian reliance on this Spinozist
metaphysics insofar as the Spinozist monism is ruptured because the problematic is a
différantial supplement. Intensity, in Laruelle, must be an intensity without the Spinozist
heritage; one that elides the monist-pluralist tautology of difference in Deleuze: a
tautology which itself becomes a form of Mastery. Laruelle’s use of intensity can be
theorized through the prospect of a critical reduction—cut from its heritage, reduced to a
generic concept. In continuing the language of intensity, Laruelle reduces the intensive to
its generality, promoting an intensity without the Spinozist lineage. Laruelle breaks from
the Spinozist aspects of Deleuzian intensity, putting forward a concept that is taken from
Deleuze and Althusser’s Spinozism, but one that ruptures the Spinozist aspect of that
concept: again, a reduction of the concept to its generic principles. Intensity is cut and

141

« …de la libido comme intensité : c’est la fluctuation ou l’oscillation de la libido lorsqu’elle passe dans
l’anneau de l’E.R.M. ou de l’affirmation, anneau de la jouissance ou de la rareté, décidément étroit, voire
étranglé par le refoulement primaire » (NcH 117).
142

Laruelle distinguishes his conception of the non-standard philosophical One from the Spinozist One (or
God) in his paper “Letter to Deleuze” (1988) trans. Robin Mackay, in From Decision to Heresy:
Experiments in Non-Standard Thought, eds. Robin Mackay (Windsor Quarry, UK: Urbanomic, 2012): 393401.

47
withdrawn from its Spinozist framework. As such, it can be read as infused with
supplementarity as an intensive alterity or machinism that is not of God, nor of the
assemblage. An intensive alterity is present in Laruelle’s machinic materialism in the
adoption of the supplement, given the distinction between of and in, where in can be
bracketed, signaling no inclusion with what it is immanent (in). This intensity is, then, a
unilaterality that never permits a rejoinder with its Other, because the unilaterality is not a
Deleuzian difference in itself, but the Other as différance: an Other that refuses any
signification, representation or name; a refusal to become a Master. It is, then, each time
a différance, not a tautology of difference.
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Chapter 3

3

Nietzschean Problematics

With the aforementioned materials consolidated, it is now possible to conceptualize the
Nietzschean problematic from Nietzsche contre Heidegger. In this chapter the
Nietzschean problematic is presented as a reduction [réduire] of the Deleuzian
problematic put forward in DR. As noted in the introduction, Laruelle situates his project
in Philosophy I as “the attempt to construct a problematic rivaling that of Marx, though
mainly on Nietzschean terrain and with Nietzschean means.”143 The aim of this chapter is
to understand this problematic as it is put forward in NcH by working through its
formalization first in Althusser, then Deleuze, before closing with Laruelle.

3.1 The Althusserian problematic
In For Marx, Althusser defines the problematic as the essence of an ideological thought:
“Every ideology must be regarded as a real whole, internally unified by its own
problematic, so that it is impossible to extract one element without altering its
meaning.”144 The problematic is what unifies all elements of thought within that system.
It is the ‘determinate content’ of the “objective problems posed for ideology by its
time.”145 For Althusser, the problematic is the immanent ideological framework that
conditions what questions can be asked within an epistemic epoch. The problematic
determines the possible questions that can be asked within the framework it determines.
For Althusser, Marx institutes a new problematic (one related to the discussion of the
continent of history in chapter 2). The exact timing of this break changes within
Althusser’s oeuvre, but this is of less importance than the notion of the break as a
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whole.146 In any case, the Marxist problematic is a new theoretical framework that allows
thought to develop in novel ways that weren’t possible under the old way of thinking. For
Althusser, this takes place in the break with Feuerbach—and to that degree a break with
Hegel—which is situated as “the adoption of a new problematic which even if it did
integrate a certain number of the old concepts, did so into a whole which confers on them
a radically new significance.”147 Marx’s problematic works by placing these concepts in
the sphere of a materialism rather than an idealism.
Both Laruelle and Deleuze alter the problematic from Althusser, instituting it as a rupture
rather than a break.148 By implementing it as a break, Althusser places the problematic
within history: the new problematic breaks with the old by implementing a new
epistemology. History contains the possibility of moving from one problematic to
another. In signaling the problematic as a rupture—an a-signifying rupture at that—
Deleuze and Laruelle position the problematic as Other to history.149
Laruelle describes the Nietzschean problematic as a ‘politico-libidinal cut.’ This is a cut
that ruptures the fabric of signification (Mastery) in an act of Rebellion. It is introduced
in the discussion of Machinic and Political materialism. He describes it as:
A unique cut, but twice split. A first time in two disciplines, a second time in the
very object of each of these disciplines. Thus, the Political Materialism (PM) has
as its object the relations of power [pouvoir] from which it withdraws [prélevés]
and specifies diverse practices, instances, or levels of the social structure. But it
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relates these relations of power, object of the materialist explication of the social
Body, a specifically material cause: the libido, the productive forces of desire, in
their relations of rigorously immanent causality which implicates a reformulation
of ‘the last instance.’ With a machinic materialism (MM), the philosophical
generality in which it poses these relations of matter and its ‘machinic’ syntaxes
cannot dissimulate the duality (duplicity) of its objects and the problems of their
necessary hierarchy. The Nietzsche cut does not contain any term, any essence,
but only the relations of duplicity and chiasm. It is what distinguishes it from the
Marxist cut, which contains, despite its contradictory and complex nature,
essences under a type of form of contradiction becoming suddenly an essence (a
form not only rationalist for the most part, but transcendental in Althusser). It is
not ‘radical’ in the sense where its radicality would be that of a generic or specific
type, unilaterally qualitative, by a relation, for example, in the Hegelian dialectic
or in the ideologies of history. (NcH 32-33)150
This cut is composed of two motions: first a cut of the discipline itself (for example, the
production of the concept of history). The second is a deeper cut that splits from the first
to get to the foundation of Mastery. Nandita Biswas Mellamphy has described this as a
‘double-crossing/dual-processing’ operation of the Nietzschean problematic.151 The
double-cross or double split ruptures the Althusserian conception (and, as will be
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discussed, the Deleuzian conception as well). The initial split fits within the Althusserian
problematic, insofar as it understands the break within history: the move from the
continent of Physics to the continent of History. It is in the second cut that this
problematic reduces itself further from signification. This time, signaling a deeper rupture
that does not merely provide the framework for a new problematic within history, but the
understanding of a problematic that breaks from any formalization. Thus, when the
Althusserian problematic institutes itself as a break, it presupposes a historical form or
essence that each break must conform to. The Nietzsche cut withdraws from that essence,
cutting on a deeper, more radical level; one that operates without any form. The politicolibidinal cut is not a cut in any structure. It is a différantial operation that ruptures any
signification, including the historical. Political materialism places the operations of
machinic materialism in an immanent position to signification, and it is from that position
that this rupture occurs.

3.2 The Deleuzian problematic
Like the concepts investigated in previous chapters, Laruelle’s use of the problematic can
be read through Deleuze. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze refers to the problematic
as an ‘indispensable neologism’ (DR 323).152 Rather than cite Althusser, Deleuze uses
mathematical theory to situate the ‘problematic’ as a mode of formalization contrasted
with ‘axiomatic formalization.’153 Axiomatic formalization is, perhaps, best known from
Euclidean geometry, where Euclid develops a geometrical system on the basis of 5
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axioms.154 Axiomatic formalization begins with a priori axioms, which are used as
building blocks for a theoretical system. Deleuze cites mathematician Georges Bouligand
as a justification for moving from this axiomatic formalization to a problematic
formalization on the basis of Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. These theorems
render “present-day attempts to formalize and axiomatize mathematics both trivial and
doomed to failure, that formalization and axiomatization have proven barren as methods
of mathematical discovery.”155 For Deleuze, an alternative method of formalization is
required to get to the possibility of axiomatic formalization.
Where axiomatic formalization begins with abstracted, a priori axioms derived through
the use of deductive reasoning, a problematic formalization begins with real world
conditions and operates using inductive reasoning. Deleuze situates this alternative
mathematical history in the schools of Archimedean and non-Euclidean geometry. For
Deleuze, these alternative schools of thought generate a formalization that isn’t based in
abstract axioms but in the conditions of real world. For example, in Euclidean geometry it
is said that the quickest path between two points is a straight line. While this is true in an
abstract sense, it might not be true in reality. One must consider the topology in which a
problem exists.156 Following his insistence that the extensive is an abstraction of the
intensive discussed in chapter 2, Deleuze suggests that axiomatic formalization is an
abstraction of real or problematic formalization. The real (and not the understanding) is
what determines the mathematical forms in problematic formalization.
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Albert Lautman’s consideration of Poincaré singularities provide Deleuze with a model
for the problematic form: A ‘mathesis universalis’ as a model for all problematic
structures. This is not a mathematical model of the universe. Rather, it is a model from
mathematics that is symptomatic of a model underlying all discourses.157 According to
Poincaré, a curve will continue around a single point to infinity within a closed cycle. It
will only diverge upon reaching a second singular point.158 Lautman outlines how these
singular points are granted a ‘dominant and exception role’ in modern theory: “the nature
of singular points on a domain determines, at each point of the domain of the variable z,
the existence of solutions of the proposed equation.”159 Singular points do not precede
the curve, for without the curve there is no point. Nevertheless, the singular point
determines the curvature of the curve: it determines the curve in the last instance. This is
not a relation of origin, but of sovereignty. The point is never dissolved into that which it
determines but remains implicated in the curve as a formalized problem.
For Deleuze, each solution contains an immanent, genetic element, that insists upon the
solution in the manner of the dialectic between the point and the curve. The curve is
determined by the point, but not preceded by it. This is a sovereign, unilateral relation. In
each case, the problematic is not represented in the Idea, but immanently generates it as a
place of rupture (DR 178). Deleuze extends Lautman’s notion that the problematic is
manifest in a solution to suggest that every solution contains an immanent problematic
that insists upon it as a sovereign determination (DR 179).160 Lautman provides Deleuze
with a structure for an immanent problematic—the singular point that insists on the
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curve—by using the problematic in mathematics to structure the problematic in other
discourses. For his purposes, this is useful because it allows him to extend this
mathematical model onto philosophy. Using the prefix ‘non’ to signal the singular point
or problematic of Being as ‘non-Being,’ Deleuze writes, “Being is also non-being, but
non-being is not the being of the negative; rather it is the problematic, the being of the
problem and the question” (DR 64). To signify this non-being as the problematic, rather
than a negation, Deleuze alters the term to ‘(non)being’ or ‘?being.’161 Being is said in
the sense of Spinoza: the Being which encapsulates everything; Being is One (though not
‘One’ in the sense of non-standard philosophy).162 Via Lautman, Deleuze applies the
problematic form of the Poincaré curve to Being through the insistence of (non)being.
(Non)being is an intensive determination that undermines the conceptualization of Being
as abstract universal. In searching for the determination of the question of Being, rather
than attempting to solve it, Deleuze ruptures Althusser’s problematic break at its
foundation: the problematic rupture explores the conditions of possibility, allowing for
the possibility of speaking the unspoken.
Being and (non)being form an aporia. (Non)being is placed on the side of difference and
intensity; Being with the same and extensity. Historically, difference is thought in terms
of an exclusive disjunction between two identities. Forms are assumed a priori to the
difference between those forms. For Deleuze, this conception ignores the fact that
‘something in the world’ determines those representations (DR 149). He inverts the
historical structure so that the forms are determined by a problematic, transcendental
intensification: difference in itself. Deleuze abstracts from real conditions to produce a
determining principle of identity and representation. Suggesting that difference includes
the unequal in itself, this concept is integral to the inclusive disjunction
monism=pluralism. The univocity of Being provided by Spinozist monism is
simultaneously a differential and intensive becoming. Difference in itself mixes the two
sides of the being-(non)being aporia. Difference is no longer the difference between
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identities, but the generative differential in the formation of identity: the singular points
or singularities that determine various curvatures of Being. This is not the negation of one
identity in the mediation of another, but the positive force that produces identity by way
of a cut. Difference in itself, as (non)being or problematic of Being, undermines the
classical conception of philosophy wherein Being totalizes thought. Now, Deleuze boldly
claims, “difference is behind everything, but behind difference there is nothing” (DR
157).
In promoting difference from its subordination to Being, Deleuze breaks with Being’s
transcendence, identity, and representation. Yet, difference is not instituted as a
transcendent form. Difference in itself does not transcend but is immanent to Being.
Deleuze attempts to undermine the logo-centrism of the image of thought, liberating
thought from the domination of a central dogmatic hermeneutic. For Deleuze, this
liberation can only come about through this problematic (non)being of Being—the
immanent generator of Being which, as immanent to Being, is no longer transcended by
Being. Here, difference is co-constituted in Being, rather than preceded by it: it is in a
position of sovereignty. Being, under these conditions, does not determine difference, but
is determined by the problematic problem: (non)being as determination of Being.

3.3 The move from (non)being to the Body-of-the-Other;
and the first synthesis of political production
Like Deleuze, Laruelle’s politico-libidinal cut operates on Being as immanent
problematic. The operative production of the politico-libidinal cut operates by putting this
aporia into the syntax developed through the consideration of the quadripartite. This
operation is explored most prominently in the 12th chapter of Nietzsche contre Heidegger
with a focus on three synthesis of political production. These syntheses serve as the
foundation for the coming analysis.
The first synthesis, “the actual production of power [pouvoir] and politics,” solidifies the
idea that political production in the will to power is not a technical or natural energy.
Instead, it is the unconscious matrix of power operating upon the technical or natural as a
politico-libidinal cut (NcH 112). This is the rebellious cut of a-signification that operates
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unilaterally upon signification as an intensive rupture. As in Deleuze, this functions as an
internal mechanism (interior to, but not of) that which it produces. Laruelle describes this
as a cut that is constantly cutting the undifferentiated. In a Deleuzian sense, this operation
‘makes the difference,’ as the internal motor of change. It is represented in an algorithmic
formula:
O/B-b
But also at least in its full operation,
B-b/Ob
thus: O/B-b/Ob (NcH 121).
This equation expresses the cut of the Other on Being. ‘O’ is the Other that takes the
place of (non)being in the Deleuzian problematic. The Other is that which cuts the
sameness of representation or presence. ‘B-b’ signals what Laruelle terms Being-withoutbeing [Être-sans-étant]. Being-without-being is described by Laruelle as constituting the
false totality of Being. Being in Nietzsche is never Being-in-totality (as one might
consider Being in the dogmatic image of thought). Nietzsche’s Being [Être] is described
as “the ‘totality’ specific to difference or the cut without being [étant], the différance out
of the abyss, therefore a false totality, that we name this object—also cumbersome, but
unavoidable—Being-without-being, or the Body-of-the-Other” (NcH 174).163
The distinction of Être and étant is key, with Être signaling the totality of Being (not
unlike Deleuze’s monism) and étant signaling the plurality of beings in the process of
becoming. In positioning Being as a false totality or ‘Being-without-being,’ Laruelle
signals a rupture at the heart of Being: Being is empty and that emptiness is generative. It
makes sense to position this conception alongside what Deleuze and Guattari call the
Body-without-organs, insofar as it is Being without Image as a false totality: Being
without composition, Being-without-organs. Nevertheless, Laruelle’s language can still
be read as a disruption of Deleuze’s Spinozism, insofar as it ruptures the equation of
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Deleuze and Guattari’s inclusive disjunction (Being-without-being is a rejection of being
[étant] as Being [Être]). This rupture of Being(without-being), by way of the Other, is
represented in the algorithm by the ‘/,’ indicating a position of sovereignty. Thus, the
Other operates in a position of sovereignty over Being(-without-Being), which has, itself,
perpetually been placed in a position of sovereignty over being [étant] or Body-of-theOther.
In both Deleuze and Laruelle there is a shift in the consideration from a historical
problematic to an a-historical problematic—a shift from signification to a-signification—
in the rupturing of Althusser. When Deleuze positions the (non)being as problematic of
Being, or when Laruelle institutes the Other as the rupture of Being(-without-being), it
signals the problematic of Being as a rupture rather than a break. (Non)being as Other is
not transcendent to Being but operates as a sovereign rupture of Being. In The Logic of
Sense, Deleuze refers to this problematic as “the mode of the event.”164 Singular points
can be understood as conditioning and determining the event in a determination of
“singularities inside the field of vectors [which] preside over the genesis of the solutions
of the equation.”165 This singularity in Deleuze constitutes a rupture: it pushes through a
threshold in what is called an aleatory point. The aleatory point is introduced in DR as a
single roll of the dice that alters all other rolls. He gives a further account in The Logic of
Sense:
The set of throws is included in the aleatory point, a unique cast which is
endlessly displaced through all series, in a time greater than the maximum of
continuous, thinkable time. These throws are successive in relation to one another,
yet simultaneously in relation to this point which always changes the rule, or
coordinates and ramifies the corresponding series as it insinuates chance over the
entire length of each series.166
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The aleatory point is not merely the affirmation of the roll of the dice; it is the affirmation
of chance each time in a single roll that contains all the throws in a single point. The one
point alters the playing field. This dice roll is linked with singular points, suggesting that
it is the singular point which contains the possibility of the rupture: “the throw of the dice
carries out the calculation of problems, the determination of differential elements or the
distribution of singular points which constitute a structure.”167
This is, furthermore, placed in direct relationship with Nietzschean transvaluation:
This aleatory point which circulates through singularities and emits them as
preindividual and impersonal does not allow God to subsist. It does not tolerate
the subsistence of God as an original individuality, nor the self as a Person, nor
the world as an element of the self and as God’s product… It is the decentred
centre which traces between series, and for all disjunction, the merciless straight
line of the Aion, that is the distance wherein the castoff of the self, the world, and
God are lined up: the Grand Canyon of the world, the ‘crack’ for the self, the
dismembering of God. Upon this straight line of the Aion, there is also an eternal
return.168
This passage situates the aleatory and transvaluation with a reading of Nietzsche that is
repeated in Deleuze’s oeuvre. In Foucault, Deleuze suggests that Nietzsche is not the
thinker of the death of God, but the death of Man. The death of God is found in
Feuerbach, who produces a dialectic between man and God. Feuerbach “shows that since
God has never been anything but the unfold of man, man must fold and refold God.”169
This relates to Nietzsche and Philosophy—written 25 years earlier—when Deleuze
suggests that “Man takes God’s place, [man] recuperates the divine as his own property
or essence, and that theology becomes anthropology… God becomes Man, Man becomes
God” (NP 158). Man and God enter into a relationship where man inverts God, but in that
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overcoming, re-inscribes God in himself. God may die but continues living in Man. The
failure of the death of God is a failure of degree. Feuerbach repeats God where God is
folded into Man. This Man-God relationship does not break from the structure of God,
but folds, unfolds and refolds the theistic structure in a variety of ways. Man is an
inversion of God, but as inversion reflects God. This is why Nietzsche is not the thinker
of the death of God: he aims beyond this simple repetition of reversals. For Deleuze,
Nietzsche is unique in refusing both Man and God, instituting the notion of the
overhuman as one that goes beyond the Man-God dichotomy.
It is from this position, I argue, that it is possible to place Nietzsche in the place of the
problematic within Deleuze’s work by way of Laruelle. This is both an inventive move
on the part of Laruelle, but also something that appears within the text, given the
intensive and machinic characteristics that Deleuze aligns with his problematic. Deleuze
considers the overhuman as a rupture of the Man-God image of thought; an aleatory point
that ruptures from a singular point immanent to the structure. This is an epistemic
rupture, a problematic that alters the playing field. Yet, insofar as it is a rupture of the
aleatory sort, it is not merely a rupture within history, but from an immanence that is
outside of history (in but not of). The intensive qualities of the will to power rupture the
Man-God epistemic field, instituting the realization of a new image of thought that is
inventive, operating through the complex relation of forces that, for Deleuze, constitute
the relation of the will to power and force.
It is at this point, however, that a critique of Deleuze’s can be made from Laruelle’s
position. To do this, I find it helpful to turn to Barbara Stiegler’s critique of Deleuze’s
Nietzsche. Stiegler focuses on Deleuze’s attempt to escape from representational thought
(with a new image of thought), suggesting that The Birth of Tragedy undermines his
reading. She writes: “When we read The Birth of Tragedy is it the world of representation
that collapses? Quite the contrary! And it is closely analyzing Nietzsche’s accounts of
biology and their part in the conception of the eternal return, there just is no dissolution
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of Identity or the Same.”170 According to Stiegler, Deleuze disqualifies The Birth of
Tragedy when he denies Apollo (the representational) for Dionysus (chaos, the will to
power, the machinic-intensive). While it is true that Nietzsche mostly abandons Apollo
after his initial text, Stiegler recognizes the continuation of representation in his use of
Ariadne.171
Like those between Dionysus and Apollo, the tensions between passive exposures
to alterity (the flux) and active reorganizations by identity (the stasis) remain, for
Nietzsche, insurmountable. They lead him to argue that every living being,
because it is suffering […] is already a subject that produces conscience, fictions,
and necessary representations. From this point of view the 1960s in general, and
Deleuze in particular, were wrong to read Nietzsche as either dissolving or
denouncing identity. A ‘Fractured I,’ yes, in the sense that all organic identity of
the I is forever fractured or wounded by the excess of Dionysus and by the
threatening, abrupt arrival of difference.172
For Stiegler, Nietzsche is interested in the interplay between the suffering identity
(Apollonian) and the flux of chaos (Dionysian). In the production of a new, Nietzschean
image of thought on the basis of difference, Deleuze collapses Being and difference.
Deleuze himself frames this as a tautology: “difference is behind everything, but behind
difference there is nothing” (DR 157). In promoting difference from a subordination to
Being, Deleuze breaks with a transcendent Being (of the Same). Difference becomes an
immanent, unilateral, transcendental force that functions as the immanent operation (a
problematic) of Being. But in promoting this new image of thought, Deleuze does away
with representation and Being. Rather than implementing a dynamic play of Being and
difference (signification and a-signification, Être and étant), difference in itself comes to
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dominate the aporia as a new Master. For Deleuze, critique absconds the negative in an
act of rupture—a perpetual rupture that doesn’t negate. Certain critics of Deleuze attempt
to turn him into a figure of identity or the One, emphasizing the Spinozist aspect of
monism within the monism=pluralism equation.173 Stiegler’s critique comes from a
different position and gets to a deeper problem. She maintains a negativity of identity that
is outside of the dialectic that she reads into Nietzsche through Apollo. This is not a
negativity of identity, but a flux of identity and non-identity where neither are placed in a
primary or hierarchical relation with the other. Stiegler reveals a third position that is in
contrast to both Deleuze (who prioritizes Dionysus) and alternatives that prioritize
Apollo. In siding with Dionysus against Apollo—placing Difference in a position of
primacy over Being—Deleuze falls into the rubric that Laruelle puts forward regarding
rebellion: overthrow and re-inscription. Deleuze overthrows representation with his
machinic materialism, but in the act of rebellion implements a new image of thought on
the basis of difference. In doing so, difference becomes a new form of Master where
monism and pluralism are mixed under the form of difference.174

3.4
The second and third syntheses of political
production
The process Deleuze falls into can be understood through Laruelle’s second synthesis of
political production: “the production of inscription or political reproduction.” Where the
first synthesis is the disruption of Being as totality, recognizing it as a false totality or
Being-without-being that is overthrown by the Body-of-the-Other on its own terrain, the
second synthesis is a second movement within Nietzschean rebellion where Being is reinscribed as the being of becoming. The problematic retains its status as a partial organ of
power in relation to this Being, yet, “Inversely, the partial organs, which form the content
of political production, are trans-propriated or related with the undifferentiated, grounded
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Body” (NcH 113).175 In the first synthesis, the undifferentiated body of Being was
ungrounded by the cut of the Other. This cut operates unilaterally in a sovereign position
to Being that ruptures Being as totality, recognizing it as Being-without-being. In the
second synthesis that very act of rupture—that which Deleuze calls becoming or
difference—finds itself installed as a new form of Master: a new totality. In this second
synthesis, the rupture of the first synthesis is re-inscribed as a Master: the rupture of
presence is signified “‘in front’ of presence itself” (NcH 114).176 One would be mistaken,
however, to suggest that this is a simple repetition of the old totality of Being: Deleuze,
for instance, does not return to a “disguise of desire as lack” but instead suggests a shift
from a primacy of Being as totality to a totality (or tautology) of difference (NcH 115).
Despite being a repetition with a difference, the notion of a totality is nevertheless
repeated: the initial rupture is introduced as a “positive guise or fetish (unavoidable as
Being) produced by a determinate a-signifying cause” (NcH 115).177 As with the first
synthesis, the second is presented as an algorithm:
B/(O/B-b/Ob)

(NcH 121)

Being, ‘B,’ returns, re-inscribed as a sovereignty over the first synthesis (O/B-b/Ob), in a
complementary inclusive disjunction. The Body-of-the-Other, expressed as the cut from
the abyss of Being in (but not of) Being-without-being (a false totality), is not outside of
Being, but immanent and complementary of Being. For Laruelle, Deleuze is stuck in this
synthesis, insofar as his tautological claim (“Difference is behind everything, but behind
difference there is nothing” (DR 57)) and his Spinozist equation (‘monism=pluralism’),
equate the Body-of-the-Other as Being-in-itself.
Following from Laruelle’s discussion of the Master and the Rebel, it can be surmised that
being [étant] must overcome Being [Être] without itself becoming of Being: Rebel must
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overcome Master without itself becoming of Mastery. In the act of overthrowing the
Master/Being, being as Rebel is re-inscribed as a new Mastery of the second synthesis. It
is for this reason that Laruelle refuses to institute being as Being, instead suggesting that
Being must be overcome on its own terrain—in the emptiness of Being-without-being.
Immanent to this false totality is not the Other as a complement, but a supplement. The
Rebel cannot overcome the Master by adopting the Master’s position. The Rebel must
attain a supplementary function, as Body-of-the-Other in a rupture, but a rupture that
works through a process of withdrawal and reduction, rather than a rupture that attains
the position of what was destroyed.
Where the second synthesis implements the initial split of the chiasm into the position of
the undifferentiated totality that it cut, the third synthesis operates as the second split that
allows for a rupture of Mastery on the Master’s terrain. This third synthesis is titled “on
the subject or affect: the internal subjectivation of agents of power.” As the name implies,
this synthesis conceives an understanding of the internal subject that works in the
production of power—that which has been named the problematic or the politicolibidinal cut. This synthesis operates by bringing together the first and second synthesis in
a relation of inclusive disjunction in terms of duplicity or supplementarity, rather than a
dualism or complementarity. Rebel retains a position of supplement to Being. Laruelle’s
use of duplicity enables him to consider a problematic that is not unlike Deleuze’s but
which function without turning the problematic (for Deleuze difference, for Laruelle
différantials) into a new form of Master. It is his conception of critique as reduction—
here a reduction from the Spinozist equation—that makes this possible. Laruelle retains
the problematic in a position of immanence to that which it determines, but as
supplement. Here, “Immanence, as one understands it, does not signify an interiority, but
on the contrary, indicates an absolute exteriority (not of a representation (=transcendence)
but a topological surface of Being [Être], nothing other than a passage” (NcH 119).178 As
supplement, the problematic is immanent to, but not of (as an immanent exteriority). It is
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withdrawn from Being, only a passage or abyss that overcomes Being on Being’s terrain.
Laruelle continues to suggest that it is in this third synthesis that the unconscious,
libidinal production of the will to power is placed in a position outside and exterior to
Being, yet where it is simultaneously immanent. Thus, it breaks from turning the
unconscious into a totality, into Being: “the third synthesis reassembles the process,
produces and reproduces it by consuming it in the ecstasy of a pure material e-motion,
thus extracting the subject of the unconscious from analytic representation” (NcH
119).179 This process of extraction and reduction (rather than a complementarity, in the
case of Deleuze, or a negativity, in the case of the traditional theory), frees machinic
materialism, as a libidinal unconscious, from the false totality of Being. The third
synthesis works to place this machinic unconscious process in a position of sovereignty
to (but not primacy over) the Being re-inscribed in the second synthesis. It is presented
as:
S/(B/(O/B-b/ob))

(NcH 121)

Libidinal subjectivization, ‘S,’ is placed in a position of unilateral sovereignty to Being.
This third synthesis conceives of this subject as the immanent problematic of Being, one
which is, nevertheless, in a position of exterior supplementarity to Being. It brings
together the first and second synthesis in a new, duplicitous, inclusive disjunction that
ruptures the claim of Being over the World/the Real. Laruelle states,
This subject is, each time, the remainder of an inclusive operation or
subordination, i.e. that which despite and through a primary repression, having
satisfied a revolutionary critique as being-towards-death, passes from agents of
power to the Continental ground on which it is inscribed. (NcH 117)180
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The revolutionary subject is the remainder or excess of this inscription that is reduced
from that which it is in excess to. Libido, as intensity, is described here as a synthesis of
both negation and affirmation, rather than a negation of a negation. This is not, however,
a mixture of negation and affirmation (a mixture of the aporia), but what could be called
a mixture without mixing where both terms remain strictly distinct. This subjectivization
is a-signifying:
Finally, it is a fluctuating synthesis (syntax) of impulses and of Body (semantics)
returning beyond [au-delà] the wall of repression, the reconciliation of a double
syntactical place of the eternal return of the same and the will to power, this
subject will receive as a ‘specific’ material content, no longer power or the libido
as they are properly said, but their affect reduced to intensive movement, as it
envelops the complex relations of power and the libido. (NcH 118)181
The names given to the eternal return and the will to power are themselves ruptured in the
syntax, for the syntax is a-signifying and without proper name. Any name given is only a
name in the weakest sense: a naming of that which cannot be named. This is akin to the
concept of différance in Derrida, a (non)concept insofar as it is a supplement reduced or
withdrawn from the name given to it.182 Laruelle’s Nietzschean syntax or problematic
envelops even those names: here, of power and the libido. All that remains is the real
intensive operation of affects.
The subjectivation of this syntax is, for Laruelle, the possibility of going beyond
signification. He writes: “It’s an effect of syntax or operation [fonctionnement] of the
preceding syntheses, there is no pathetic existential here. The ‘human’-being of man, as
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Nietzsche understands it, by the most rigorous necessity as both pre- and over-human”
(NcH 119).183 The human is immanent to Man where Man is a universal—a false
universal or false totality. In this immanence, the human contains the possibility of the
overcoming of Man through its position of immanent exteriority. This human potential is,
for Laruelle, the Nietzschean overhuman. It goes beyond the universal signification of
Man as human. overhuman is the subject of the Nietzschean syntax and the possibility of
the beyond. Like différance, it is instituted as a weak identity in terms of its signification:
overhuman as a supplemental externality in a duplicity with Man: the overhuman as the
intensive dangerous supplement of man. This is not a strong name, but names that which
escapes the signification of naming (i.e. it is a-signifying). Nevertheless, it is this
overhuman subject that is granted sovereignty in the algorithm. It is instituted unilaterally
as that which provides the second split of the politico-libidinal cut. It is because of this
second split, that the cut can be rendered as ‘double-crossing.’
Double-crossing should be understood here, with a rejoinder to the conceptualization of
determination-in-the-last-instance, as occurring ‘once each time.’ It is the second split of
the cut—in the third synthesis—which is imperative here, for it is that which
distinguishes Laruelle’s problematic from Deleuze’s (a distinction only made possible by
first reducing Deleuze’s problematic from his Spinozist metaphysics). It is only through
this second split that Laruelle presents “the possibility for theory to be surmounted as
theory, and for any (practical) representation of politics to be destroyed as representation
(thus also as thesis, position, primacy, etc.)” (NcH 135).184 It is only with the second split
that Mastery can be overcome on its own terrain without the Rebel becoming of the
Master. It is useful to take theory up as a brief case study, applying it through the three
syntheses, using Deleuze as an example. Deleuze comes out of a tradition of dialectics, in
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which he attempts to think through a process of production that doesn’t operate through
the Hegelian dialectic. As presented above, Deleuze institutes the initial split in Being
(the first synthesis) as a cut that is more radical than those who come before him
(Althusser), insofar as it is instituted as an a-historical (and a-signifying) rupture, rather
than an epistemological break within history. Nevertheless, once this initial act of
rebellion and overthrow is instituted, Deleuze’s own split (difference in itself) comes to
take the place Being as a totality. The act of the double cross operates, once each time, as
a second split that cuts the initial split. This second split is derived from the initial split
but acts upon the initial split as it re-inscribes the position of Mastery. This doublecrossing split operates ‘once each time’ to perpetually overthrow the re-inscription
(without itself re-inscribing Mastery) through the operation of the Nietzschean
problematic or politico-libidinal cut. In other words, it cuts the initial cut as that cut is reinscribed as totality. This unlocks a perpetual unfolding of the three syntheses (1. Cut, 2.
Re-inscription, 3. Double-crossing cut). Theory or philosophy is overcome each time as it
generates a false totality. This overcoming is provided by theory itself, as supplement,
that is reduced from the false totality of theory. Deleuze overcomes Deleuze on
Deleuzian terrain, each time, so as not to become a new dogmatism.
As perpetual, the politico-libidinal rupture is never finished, but always to-come [avenir]:
The most high affirmation of machinic materialism, the sovereignty of the libido
against the final theoretical (and other) code, signifies that the libidinal cut is no
longer just the order of past or present, no longer the intra-historical (circa 1881),
but that it re-turns, suspended as the to-come [a-venir], in a manner at once
destructive and affirmative, in the intimate forum of the most actual history. (NcH
135)185
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The rupture of Mastery is perpetual: a constant double-crossing, a constant split. Each
time splitting, once each time. The immanent generator of values is simultaneously the
overcoming of values: the overhuman who is to-come. Nietzsche’s double-crossing cut
is, thus, rendered as immanent problematic that is always on the horizon: an immanence
‘in’ but not ‘of’ that which it determines-in-the-last-instance. His politico-libidinal cut
operates at once as invention and intervention, intervening as it invents or cuts through an
in(ter)vention.186 This is the operation of the will to power: “It is the will to power which
interprets” (NcH 12).187 But this is a perpetual interpretation that is consistently
intervening, inventing and interpreting. A sovereignty of the cut, but not a reduction to
the cut. A perpetual play of cut and that which the cut invents. A process of invention
which is then intervened upon. Through this process of in(ter)vention, the politicolibidinal cut of Nietzsche operates in the “problematic by withdrawing from dogmatism,
gesturalism and activism” (NcH 133).188 Any dogma is perpetually intervened upon. This
act of critical reduction opens to the libidinal operations that go beyond signifying
operations through the cut’s a-signifying rupture.
Unlike Deleuze, where invention would involve the act of promiscuous creation, the
Laruellean in(ter)vention is a reduction that is always on the horizon. The overcoming of
any dogmatic image of thought is, thus, not the implementation of a Nietzschean image
of thought, but a Nietzschean problematic as genetic operation of Being that perpetually
intervenes on Being through the act of in(ter)vention. Each in(ter)vention takes place on
the terrain of that which it intervenes: theory is overcome on the terrain of theory, Being
is overcome on the terrain of Being. These overcoming, taking place on the terrain,
operate through a reduction or abstinence. A refusal of the terrain’s sufficiency. It is with
this that it is possible, again, to turn to the opening pages of the text where it is said that
“Nietzsche is made fascist for better defeating fascism. He has taken on the worst forms
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« à la problématique en lui retirant le dogmatisme, la gestualité, et l’activisme » (NcH 133).
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of Mastery to become the Rebel” (NcH 9).189 Here, Nietzsche is not ‘of’ fascism, but the
Nietzschean problematic is, nevertheless, immanent to fascism. Overcoming is not a
simple negation, nor a mediation, but a duplicitous act of rebellion from a place of
immanence that ruptures from below. This immanence is not complementary to fascism,
but its supplement; a dangerous supplement that ruptures fascism by making itself
supplement to fascism, but never becoming of fascism. As supplement (made possible by
the reduction from Deleuze), fascism is overcome without negation or mediation (both
which would return to a new form of Mastery). Instead, it enters into a contradiction
without mediation—a relation of duplicity—that ruptures fascism from the inside by way
of the Nietzschean problematic.
This process works in a similar manner in each case. Every totality—Fascism, Being,
theory, difference—is overcome on its own terrain insofar as it is a false totality. Because
it is false, the Other always insists upon it. In reducing the totality from its place of
ideological authority, the problematic critique provides a dangerous supplement that is
immanent to the totality. Take the given example of Man and human. In reducing Man
from its ideological position of totality, the human is supplement. The relation between
human (rebel) and Man (master) is one of duplicity, because the human refuses to
complement Man. Human operates as a libidinal threat that is to-come, its very material
existence threatens the totality of Man. This brings together the political materialism of
duplicity with the machinic materialism of the libido. These processes provide the criteria
for the rupturing of Man by the human. Yet, through this rupture, the human may institute
itself as a new totality. Thus, it is the a-signifying overhuman—on the horizon or tocome—that is never signified. This to-come operates on the totality each time. Taking up
something similar to the mathesis universalis of Deleuze, this model can be taken as
modeling each totality. Each totality, as false, can be critiqued through a reduction by
way of the a-signifying cut. It is here that the overcoming of each totality occurs, once
each time, by way of the Nietzschean problematic as a politico-libidinal cut: The
overcoming of Being by Being, the overcoming of theory by theory, the overcoming of
189
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difference by difference, and the overcoming of Fascism by Fascism. Each totality
overcome on its own terrain by the supplementary Other that explicates the falsity of its
totalizing claim.
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Conclusion
An implicit aim in coming towards this project is the question of how to generate novelty.
In other words: how can ‘the new’ emerge? The Nietzschean problematic, as it is
rendered by François Laruelle, is offered as a possibility for this emergence. By looking
to the problematic as both a reduction from the World and a supplement to the World, it
offers up the possibility of novelty in a World that appears increasingly enclosed—a
World with no exterior milieu to steal or borrow from. By instigating it as a withdrawn
supplement, the Nietzschean problematic takes up this position of exteriority in relation
to the World: it is in the World, but it is not of the World. In NcH, the production of
novelty aims against the perpetual unfolding of academic citation and interpretation. The
unfolding of Nietzschean interpretation focuses too strongly on the text. For Laruelle, a
citation of Nietzsche can be interpreted in any number of ways. Yet, these various ways
miss the central aspect of ‘Nietzsche:’ the operation the makes those various
interpretations possible. It is through an investigation into that operation—what is termed
throughout a problematic or syntax—that the possibility of novelty in Nietzsche may
emerge.
This thesis has explored this Nietzschean problematic as the central consideration of
Nietzsche contre Heidegger. By introducing Laruelle’s text through a number of
concepts—some Althusserian but most Deleuzian—it has provided an account of how
NcH both extends and subverts the lineage it exists in (but perhaps not of). NcH ruptures
the theoretical model of both ideological negation and machinic complementarity to issue
a new machinic supplementarity that works by way of a critical reduction. This rupture is
not merely the rupture of a particular totality. Operating by way of the perpetual play of
the three Nietzschean syntheses of production, this Nietzschean problematic works to
rupture every totality ad perpetuum through its signaling of the overhuman/overturning
that is to-come [a-venir]. Rather than signaling this as a pure outside or a complementary
immanence, the source of this rupture is a determination (in-the-last-instance) which is
both immanent in (but not of) while being exterior to that which it ruptures.
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I have addressed this possibility through three chapters, each building upon the others,
which provide an account of this problematic. The first chapter explores the four (weak)
terms of the quadripartite/chiasm, relaying them as a-signifying. It outlines the position of
the Rebel in terms of a duplicity or supplementarity which broke from the
complementarity of Deleuze-Guattarian inclusive disjunction (of complementarity). This
enables Laruelle to simultaneously rupture the dogmatic image of thought (alongside
Deleuze) while refusing to allow the mediation of the unilateral action to re-inscribe itself
as a new form of Master.
The second chapter enacts this movement to introduce the conception of machinic and
political materialism within the continent of politics which, together, overcome (without
rejecting) the dialectical and historical materialism of Marx/Althusser’s continent of
history. Inventing this continent, Laruelle produces a machinic materialism (via Deleuze)
infused with différance (via Derrida) which uses a method of critical reduction to unearth
the supplementarity of every totality—with the example of the Foucauldian statement
reduced to the Nietzschean proposition. This, furthermore, enables an understanding of
Laruelle’s own machinic materialism as a critical reduction of Deleuze-Guattarian
machinic materialism, insofar as it adopts the attributes of the libidinal unconscious and
intensification, but without Deleuze’s Spinozist monism.
All of this culminates in the third chapter which unpacks the Nietzschean problematic as
it exists reduced from both Althusser and Deleuze. The three syntheses of political
production (in this problematic) are of utmost importance. It is here that the critique of
Deleuze is most clearly fleshed out (with help from Barbara Stiegler), to show his return
to mastery by way of the first two syntheses: the rupture of the initial syntheses is
encoded into the Mastery of the second (in a perverse return to the cyclical hypothesis). It
is only from the third syntheses—that of the overhuman who is to-come—that this cycle
is broken. With the extension of this supplementarity each totality is recognized as false,
providing an opening to its own overcoming.
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